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Mr. Carr's reputation as a Kremlinologist is well-established and 
his works are an invaluable guide to the student of Russian history. 
But even the best of historians may have a flaw. I believe a close 
examination of his works will show the flaw in Mr. Carr to be his de-
terministic approach to writing history and I believe it can be shown 
that this attitude is reflected in his treatment of the dissolution of 
the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1918. Because of the presence of 
this attitude in his works, I believe Mr. Carr leaves the reader with 
the wrong impression of the assembly. 
I have chosen Mr. Carr's treatment of the Constituent Assembly as 
the basis for my work because I consider a proper understanding of the 
forces around the Constituent Assembly vital to an understanding of the 
nature of Soviet power. By his misinterpreting the nature of the 
October revolution, I honestly feel Mr. Carr has been forced by his de-
terministic outlook to relegate to an inconsequential role in the 
evolution of the Soviet state the Constituent Assembly and its pro-
ponents. Mr. Carr seems to me also to have missed the republican 
i~ealism of the revolution, an idealism which culminated in the Con-
stituent Assembly, and is content to describe t he emergence of a state. 
This is the same as saying the revolution was only an unpleasant inter-. . 
lude in Russia's history, while it does n~t recognize the similarity 
between the Bolshevik brand of totalitarianism and that which characteri~ed 
earlier Russian history. 
In my work, I have claimed Mr. Carr is not describing the extension 
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of statism within a state, but is trying to describe the creation of a 
new state. To me, this would be roost difficult since I regard the kind 
of control through power represented by the Communist party as closely 
corresponding to the traditional statist concepts held by the Russian 
people. To me, there was no creation of a state, except in the outward 
appearance, but merely the re-emergence of a traditional concept which 
held that strong centralized state government is good for Russia. Mr. 
Carr, in failing to note this, must stand accused of not giving enough 
forethought to the forces which helped create the revolution and of 
depending entirely too much on the Bolshevik pledges to build a new 
order from old lumber. 
For aid on this paper I gratefully acknowledge the following: Dr. 
Alfred Levin, whose kind patience and tolerance encouraged me to con-
tinue this work; Dro Sidney Brown, who suggested the topic as a possible 
theme for a thesis; Dr. Theodore L. Agnew, whose willingness to excuse 
first errors of form was exceeded only by his ability to find them, and, 
lastly, Dr. Homer L. Knight, Head of the Department of History, who 
always believed I could do it if only given a little more time. 
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11 ••• it would be impossible, within th'e confines of a review, to 
document fully the overtones and undertones of Mr. (E.H.) Carr's work(! 
History E.f. Soviet Russia, Volume I, ~ Bolshevik Revolution, .1917-1923). 
So skillful and subtle has his presentation been, so tightly have his 
reconceptions been woven into the fabric of his sentences and his para-
graphs, so carefully have his quotations been chosen, that a completely 
effective demonstration of the bias would require a dissection, an argu-
ment, and a restatement of the facts on at least the scale he has chosen 
for his own work. Doubts arise from the very start " (Ii) • • • 
- ~ London Times, 16 Feb., 19.51, Literary 
Supplement, p. 102. 
This work is an attempt to do with one particular segment of E. H. 
Carr9 s ! History of So·~ Russia, Volume I, ~ Bolshevik Revolut ion, 
!2J:1-19231 what the Times advised f or the entire book. We shall test the 
hypothesis that there emerges from a dissection of Mr. Carr's treatment 
of the Constituent Assembly a philosophy of history generally known as 
historical determinism. For our purposes, because it is the definition 
to which Mr. Carr subscribes, determinism will mean in these pages that 
" ••• the data, being what they are whatever happens happens definitely and 
could not be different. 112 
1 
New York: Macmillan & Co., 19.51, 430 pages. 
2E.H. Carr,~ Is Histor;y1 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), p. 122. 
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Our concern is to what extent, if any, does Mr. Carr allow this ap-
proach to writing history to color his handling of the section on the 
Constituent Assembly, and whether this prevents him from reaching an 
accurate and realistic interpretation of the role the assembly played in 
the Russian Revolution. This work is not an attack on determinism per~, 
since the author finds many facets of that philosophy compatible with his 
own philosophy of history. Nor will this work belabor the time-worn 
controversy between determinism and free will. But this work will attempt 
to analyze how a dependence upon a philosophy of history to supply a rhyme 
and a reason to historical progression can lead to a misinterpretation of 
historical fact. 
The need for a reinterpretation of Mr. Carr's writings is three-fold. 
First, this is desirable because of Mr. Carr's stature within the Russian 
studies area and the emergence of his works as standard source material on 
the Soviet system. Secondly, reinterpretation is possible, because of the 
opportunity given by the recent appearance of Mr. Carr's~~ History? 
to compare the stated philosophy of history in it with the philosophy of 
history .inherent in the first volume of! History E.f. Soviet l2!,ssia. In 
~~History? Mr. Carr has given us a vivid statement of his philosophy 
of history. We will, of course, never be entirely certain if this phi-
losophy sprang from his pen as he wrote, or if it was something he arrived 
at prior to writing. It is possible only to compare the stated philosophy 
for consistency with the "hidden" philosophy and to try to determine how 
this philosophy is re.fleeted in Mr. Carr9 s writing. This is important be-
cause his interpretations are a fundamental part of his presentation and, 
as he recommends, it is best to know the historian so that we are better 
able to judge the work and aptness of the interpretation of the phenomena 
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described.3 Lastly, a reinterpretation of Mr. Carr's works is desirable 
because of the controversy which surrounds him. 4 
This work cannot fulfill the entire obligation. It can only hope to 
take a small segment of one volume and examine it in light of our purpose. 
For t~at reason, it must be emphasized her e that whatever conclusions are 
drawn pertain only to the section dealing with the Consti tuent Assembly 
and no~ to the entire work. 
There are many instapces throughout Volume One where philosophy and 
history meet and mingle, but nowhere is it so pointed and so indicative 
of Mro Carr9 s atti tudes as in the section dealing with the Constituent 
Assembly and, in part, in the chapter immediately preceding on the inter-
val between the March and October revolutions. It is for that reason we 
have selected this part of Mr. Carr's work as the basis for this work. 
At play here are Mr. Carr9 s attitudes toward the dramatis personae, the 
peasantry, the bourgeoisie, the concept of democracy for Russia, the 
revolutionary activity, the traditions of statism, the revolution itself, 
and the social tensions of the era. Whether all of these attitudes are a 
3Ibid., p. 24. 
4'rhat such a controversy exists scarcel y needs documentat ion. I n a 
r eview of Mr. Carr's works the most eminent historians roam f r om a salute 
to the new Caesar to a verbal crucifixion. R. V. Daniels, i n writi ng of 
Volume One in the American Igc~ts.Ei£!~, ~~ of July, 1951, said the book 
''was a disappointment as far as i t attempt ed a new i ntegrat ion of Soviet 
History." Barrington Moore, writing of the same volume in the American 
Political Science Review of September, 1951, called the book "a return to 
the grand manner ••• analysis ••• of a very high order.o.logical organization." 
It is interesting to note that this is not the only time two respected 
journals carried articles by authors who diverged widely in their analysis 
of Mr. Carr. W.N. Hoadsel writing of Mr~ Carr's International Relations 
Between 1!L2 World~ in .the American Political Sci ence Review of A~gust, 
1948, and F.L. Schuman, in r eviewing the same work for the August, 1948, 
edition of the Annals of~ American Academy of Political~ Social 
Science, reached conclusions varying with each other to an extreme degree. 
Michael Karpovich praised Mr. Carr6 s Bakunin as "the best biography ••• so 
far available," which was challenged by such writers and critics as Edmund 
Wilson and Fr anz Hoelleri ng. The list goes on and on and it would be fruit-
less to cite her e all the opi nions of wri ters who disagreed among themselves 
as to the merit of Mr. Carrjs works . The examples cited here are extnded 
only to illust rate the controversy which Mr. Carr has created. 
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direct result of Mr. Carr's determinism need not concern us, and it is 
just as well, since to link determinism with a repugnance for revolutionary 
activity, such as Mr. Carr displays, would be fruitless and pointless in-
deed. Nevertheless, we must include Mr. Carr's attitudes, however ac-
quired, in our analysis of his treatment of the Constituent Assembly. 
They are no less responsible f or his ultimate interpretations than is his 
philosophy of history. 
The Constituent Assembly met January 18, 1918, in Petrograd. It was 
composed of freely elected representatives professing to almost every 
shade of political thought in Russia at that time. The assembly had been 
sanctioned by the Provisional Government set up directly after the March, 
1917, revolution, and the Bolsheviks said nothing about cancelling it 
when they seized power in October of that year. But there was a very 
real difference in the way the two factions regarded the Constituent 
Assembly. As the name implies, the members of the Provisional Government 
deemed themselves temporary keepers of the government store. True, they 
anticipated that permanent recognition of much of their power would be 
granted by the assembly, but there is little doubt they would not have 
bowed to the assembl y 0 s will. On the other hand, the Bolsheviks had no 
intention of r elinquishing their hard-earned power to an assembly they 
held in contempt as representing "bourgeois" interests. If the assembly 
would recognize the Bolshevik faii ! £.!?.!?!J?li, then all would be well and 
good. But at the f'irst sign of reluctance on the pa.rt of the delegates 
to consent to Bolshevik domination, the Bolshevik leader, Lenin, was pre-
pared to dissolve the assembly through force of arms if necessary. Lenin 
claimed the right to do this because he considered the October revolution 
to have supplanted the March revolution and thus to have invalidated any 
plans an~ policies of the earlier Provisional Government. He also claimed 
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the right on the grounds the Bolshevik party was the legitimate revo-
lutionary power in Russia because it represented the will, conscious or 
not, of the Russian people. 
To make their control of the Constituent Assembly appear as legiti-
mate as possible in word and deed, the Bolsheviks allowed the elections 
to the assembly to proceed as planned. The results of the vote showed 
the moderate Social Revolutionary part~ to be the majority party. The 
Bolsheviks were a minority, although a powerful one. Despite claims by 
Lenin that the elections were based on out-dated party lists (made out-
dated by the October revolution) 'it appeared that the Bolsheviks did not, 
in fact, have the sympathy or understanding of a mfi,jority of the Russian 
people. 
Aware of their preaarious position and the likelihood of censure, 
the Bolsheviks attempted to solidify their gains by winning over the 
delegates to the assembly. Those who could not be influenced were to be 
excluded from the assembly through one means or another. Even so, the 
assembly did not recognize the Bolshevik seizure. Demonstrations on be-
half of the assembly, by the public and by various parties, made it obvious 
that any hopes the Bolsheviks had of dominating the assembly were fast 
fading. On January 20, the Bolsheviks dissolved the assembly and posted 
a guard to refuse reachnittance to the meeting hall. 
Mr. Carr knows and records all this and it is not in the presentation 
of facts that controversy rages about him.6 Rather, the controversy is over 
5Hereafter referred to as SRs. 
6 . 
Isaac Deutscher claims Mr. Car.r has had no access to unpublished 
material and that there is nothing "new" in Mr. Carr's presentation. 
Deutscher should know since he read the entire manuscript before it was 
published. · 
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what he does with the facts he has in hand.? Mr. Carr seems to feel that the 
facts justify relegating the assembly to a relatively insignificant place 
in the history of the evolution of the Soviet state. He further appears 
to champion the Bolshevik right to dissolve the assembly, this right 
based upon the same arguments we noted earlier as those used by Lenin. 
The Bolsheviks, then, to Mr~ Carr represent the legitimate repository of 
power. Conversely, the Constituent Assembly, as a product of the Pro-
visional Goverrnnent overthrown in October, was, to Mr. Carr, out of step 
with the times, and when it failed t o march shoulder to shoulder w.i th the 
Bolsheviks it could not blame them if it was run off the road to socialism. 
How much of this attitude toward the Constituent Assembly is the re~ 
sult of a deterministic frame of mind remains to be proven. How much is 
the result of non-deterministic prejudices likewise must be proven. If, 
as this work hopes to show, Mr. Carr 9 s interpretation about the signifi-
canoe of the Constituent Assembly is not a realistic one, then the reader 
must conclude that the assembly did have a legitimate and potent role to 
play in the revolution • . There is sufficient evidence to suggest that this 
is true. If it is true , t hen the Bolshevik dissolution of the assembly 
is more insidious than M.i"'.' o Carr seems inclined to i ndicate. I n light of 
the subsequent developnent of the Soviet leadership into dictatorship, 
the latter view has particular appeal to this author. 
The crucial point of fact which i s involved here is whether the 
October revolution did supplant the March r evolution, as Mr. Carr feels, 
?M.T. Fl.orinsky, writing in the Political Science Quarterly,. p. 286, 
January, 1951, calls Volume One "vastly infprmative and profoundly mis-
leading." Max Beloff, writing in Spectator, November 17, 1951, p. 518, says 
of Volume One that Mr. Carr is not impressed with "the tragedy of the 
transformation (in Russia)," and, apparently, cannot draw the type of cort-
clusions Beloff would appreciate. But Beloff recognizes and pays tribute 
to the "intellectual magnitude of Mr. Carr's achievement." 
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or whether it was merely an extension of the March revolution, an iso-
lated, if skillfully guided, outburst of frustration at the slowness of 
the progress of the revolution. Were the participants in the October 
revolution willing to exchange representation for dictatorship? Or were 
they convinced they were defending the March revolution? These are 
questions to be answered. 
Before any answers will be f orthcoming, we must range far afield of 
our narrow topic. We will examine the nature of the October revolution, 
the strength of the Bolsheviks at various times before the October revo-
lution, and even Mr. Carr's earliest writings. Only by seeking to under-
stand the true nature of all this, and more, can we hope to fulfill the 
task we have set for ourselves. 
CHAPTER II 
A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN ACTION 
Many historians share the belief that Mr. Carr ~1splays deterministic 
traits and that these beliefs must be guarded against when reading his 
works. In the annotated bibliography of~ Dynamics E.f. Sovi~t Society, 
Mr. Carr is listed as displaying a deterministic view of history which 
"should be noted and discounted. 111 Richard Pipes makes the same claim, 
saying Mr. Carr "selects facts to suit his principal theme: the inevitable 
triumph of Bolshevism," and that for Mr. Carr "events ••• unfold with an 
inexorable logic : the collapse of the Tsarist order, the overthrow of the 
Provisional Government, for which he holds the Bolsheviks responsible 
only in an external sense, and the ultimate victory of the Soviet regime 
••• all were unavoidable."2 Bertram Wolfe says "a historical inevi-
tability" permeates Mr. Carr0 s works and conveys the impression the 
Bolsheviks won because they had to win. 3 Professor Moseley, although 
writing of Volume II, suggests Mr. Carr is "dazzled by success" and that 
he treats the Bolshevik gains as likely to have occurred. 4 Isaac 
1w.w. Rostow, Alfred Levin tl al.,~ Dynamics of Soviet Society, 
(New York: Mentor Books, 1954), p. 2°!+8. 
2Richard E. Pipes, Review of! History of Soviet Russia, Volume I, 
The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-~, by E.H. Carr, The Russian Review, X, 
(July, 1951), p. 226. ~ 
)Bertram Wolfe, "Professor Carr's Wave of the Future," Commentary, 
XIX, (March, 1955), p. 284. 
4P.E. Moseley, Review of! History E.f. Soviet Russia, Volume I, The 
Bolshevik Revolution, !9!Z.-!.9Zl. by E.H. Carr, The~ York Times, 13 
Apr., 1952 , ·, p. " 19. 
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Deutscher, who has written perhaps the most exhaustive analysis of Carr 
as a historian of the Soviet regime, and has been the most understanding 
of Mr. Carr's critics, notes that a certain sense of "inevitability" 
creeps into Mr. Carr's description of the Ra.pallo Treaty. This is caused 
by an inclination of Mr. Carr not to differentiate between periods of 
Russian history on the basis of personalities, Deutscher says, and is un-
justified because of certain moral differences between Lenin and Stalin 
which make it difficult to ascribe the same set of motivations to both 
5 men. 
If Mr. Carr's determinism has led to criticism that "inevitability" 
is a major ingredient in his interpretation, he seems unbothered by the 
charges. The first charge, that he is deterministic, he would not refute. 
He readily admits to holding with the deterministic philosophy and even 
considers it an aid to performing the historian's highest task - the dis-
covary of ''why?" Of the second charge, that of inevitability, he calls 
it "barren and pointless."6 "Historians," he writes, "are not troubled 
by the question of inevitability because like other people they sometimes 
fall into rhetorical language and speak of an occurrence as 'inevitable' 
when they mean merely that the conjunction of factors leading one to ex-
pect it was overwhelmingly strong."? Mr. Carr once wrote that the clash 
between the Bolsheviks and the Orthodox Church was "inevitable" and he 
apologizes for his backsliding. He says he is quite prepared to do 
without such words as "inevitable," "unavoidable," "inescapable,'' etc. 
5Isaac Deutscher, "E.H. Carr As a Historian of the Bolshevik Regime," 
Russia in Transition, (New York: Grove Press, Evergreen Edition, 1960), 
pp. 217-218. 
6carr, !&!.:!::. Is History?, p. 122. 
?Ibid., p. 125. 
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But, nonetheless, the charge of inevitability must have smarted, for 
Mr. Carr has concocted a "might-have-been" school of history to explain 
why his accusers confront him with this invective. Mr. Carr suggests 
that the "might-have-been" school of history is not so much a "school of 
8 thought as one of emotion." Alternatives are not really open to the 
actors of history simply because what happened did happen, he says. Arry-
thing else would have had to have a different set of antecedent causes. 
This strict adherence to the causal approach to history is Mr. Carr's de-
fense against charges of inevitability. 
Further evidence of Mr. Carrvs determinism is contained in his The 
~ Society and is interesting because it appeared in 1951, only months 
after the publication of the first volume of the history series. The New --
Society includes a commentary on the so-called pattern of history which 
is striking in its resemblance to his philosophy of eleven years later. 
In~~ Society, Mr. Carr claims history is nothing more than a chain 
of continuous events. By studying the past, he maintains, it is possible 
to see the relationship, and only the relationship, of past events to 
future tendencies. It is not possible to predict the form of these 
tendencies, or the manner in which they will react to external pressures 
and completely autonomous circumstances, he writes.9 
Like the charge of inevitability, the charge of selectivity of facts 
has not escaped Mr. Carr. And, like the previous accusation, the latter 
one does not bother -Mr. Carr· eithel;'. "History," writes Mr. Carr, "consists 
of a corpus of ascertained facts. The facts are available to the 
historian in documents, inscriptions, and so on, like fish on the 
8 Ibid., p. 126. 
9E.H. Carr, The~ Society, (London; Macmillan, 1951), p. 14. 
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10 fish-monger's slab." These facts speak only when the historian calls 
on them: it is he who decides to which facts he will give the floor and 
in what order or context. "The historian is necessarily selective," Mr. 
Carr goes on, "and the belief in a hard core of historical facts existing 
objectively and independently of the interpretation of the historian is 
a preposterous fallacy, but one which is very hard to eradicate. 1,11 
The relationship between determinism and inevitability is obvious 
and despite Mr. Carr's dismissal of its significance, his own kind of de-
terminism is expressed best by the sense of inevitability which runs 
through this section on the Constituent Assembly. Because the terms 
inevitability and determinism are linked in an inexorable chain of their 
own, it is permissible to regard them as interchangeable during our 
examination of Mr. Carr's treatment of the Constituent Assembly. It is 
possible to constr-act from ~r. Carr's interpretations a Jacob's ladder of 
causation which leads directly from the inevitability of the October 
revolution to the dissolution of the assembly. It will be necessary here 
merely to trace the steps up this ladder by sketching their outlines, re-
turning to consider each step in all its ramifications after we have es-
tablished that a ladder, with its connotation of narrowness, exists. 
Mr. Carr begins his ascent up our ladder by speculating on the nature 
of the October revolution. Was it bourgeois-democratic or proletarian-
socialist? Mr. Carr reaches the conclusion that the October revolution 
was, for good or evil, a proletarian one.12 To those who claimed the 
elections to the Constituent Assembly, held shortly after the Bolsheviks 
10carr, ~ Is History?, p. 6. 
11 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
12E.H. Carr,! History .2f.. Sovi<ll:. Russia, Volume I, The Bolshevik 
Revolution, !2!Z.-~, (New York: Macmillan, 1951), p. · 122. 
12 
seized power in Petrograd, demonstrated clearly that a proletarian revo-
lution had not, in fact, occurred nor that it was upheld by a majority of 
the Russian people, Mr. Carr points out that Lenin's argument, which held 
that the elections were based on party lists made out-dated by the 
October revolution is "cogent. 1113 Mr. Carr also points to the coalition 
formed between the Left SRs arxi the Bolsheviks which realigned power 
within the assembly and says this gave a "potentially deceptive character" 
to the majority SR vote.14 
To substantiate his claim that "the elections, if they did not 
register the victory of the Bolsheviks, had clearly pointed the way to it 
for those who had eyes to see," Mr. Carr cites, without recor~ing the 
vote, the results in the large industrial. cities in which he says the 
Bolsheviks had almost everywhere been ahead of the other parties.15 The 
vote, then,~ deceptive as far as Mr. Carr is concerned. But, despite 
the results showing the way to a Bolshevik victory, they made it clear to 
Mr. Carr that the Constituent Assembly was to be a rallying-point for the 
bourgeois an:i the dissident social.ists. At this point, Mr. Carr dips back 
into French history to the time of the French Constituent Assembly of 1848 
and purports to see a parallel between it and the Russian Constituent As-
sembly of 1918. Should the bourgeoisie gain control over the Russian 
Constituent Assembly, as they did the French Assembly, Lenin knew it would 
• 
surely be cut to "bourgeois standards." The Bolsheviks could not allow this 
to happen and Mr. Carr quotes Lenin as determined to stand firm against the 
propertied classes an:i prevent them from suppressing the proletariat.16 
13Ibid., p. 112. 
14rbid., p. lll. 
15Ibid., p. 112. 
1~1d., p. 113. 
13 
This is valid thinking, according to Mr. Carr, who sees class lines 
becoming firm and the peasantry and proletariat becoming more detennined 
to defend the revolution from any usurpers. For Mr. Carr, such develop-
ments as the "penneation of the anny and peasantry with revolutionary 
ideas ••• created an inevitable17 clash between the Constituent As-
sembly and the •• o . toiling and exploited classes •••• 1118 The 
bourgeois nature of the assembly, plus the "inevitable" clash due to 
occur, makes the Constituent Assembiy an "anachronism" to Mr. Carr.19 In 
light of the essentially bourgeois character of the Constituent Assembly 
and the threat to the revolution-it represented, the tactics needed to 
retain power in the hands of the "proletariat" can be, if not justified 
by Mr. Carr, regarded as at least expedient. 
If the Bolsheviks were hesitant about their high-handed tactics in 
disrupting the Constituent Assembly, it was because of what Mr. Carr 
calls an "apprehension felt by someo•• of the supposed prestige of the 
Constituent Assembly among the masses."20 This apprehension was not 
justified by the events, Mr. Carr concludes, and he asserts that the 
"dissatisfaction with the Constituent Assembly itself" actually aided the 
Bolsheviks in their dissolution of it. 21 Part of this dissatisfaction Mr. 
Carr attributes to the inability of the assembly to compromise on princi-
ples of government, a factor which contributes to the "unreality of the 
17Italics mine. 
18carr, ! History of Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 114. 
19 Ibid., p. ll5. 
20 Ibid., p. 118. 
21Ibid., p. 120. 
14 
assembly."22 
When Tsereteli for the Mensheviks argued in favor of the Constituent 
Assembly an~ ,in favor of a gradual transition to socialism, Mr. Carr says 
he did so at "enormous length, as the Mensheviks had argued for 14 years," 
intimating that the Mensheviks were not prepared to accept the fact that 
the proletarian revolution had indeed occurl".ed. "Speech-making went on 
unabated for nearly twelve hours. But little that was said had any re-
lation to the world outside," Mr. Carr writes. 23 At any rate, Mr. Carr 
cannot find anywhere in the proceedipgs of the first meeting of the as-
sembly that an "alternative goyernment capable of wielding power was 
suggested or couid have been suggested. In these circumstances the de-
bates of the assembly could have no issue," he writ.es. 24 Not only the 
debate, but the very existence of the Constituent Assembly had no issue 
to Mr. Carr, who thinks the assembly was "bankrupt" because it could do 
nothing more than "repeat in substance what the second All-Russian Congress 
of Soviets had done on the morrow of the revolution ten weeks earlier."25 
All these things demonstrate to Mr. Carr the lack of "any solid basis 
or any broad support for the institutions and principles of bourgeois 
democracy in Russia. 1126 And so the Constituent Assembly, an "unreal," 
"bankrupt," "anarohronism," failed to serve any real function in the revo-
lution and did so inevitably because it simply had too much against it to 
succeed. 
22Ibid., p. 118. 
23rbid., p. 119. 
24rbia;~ 
25Ib1d., p. 120. 
26Ibid., p. 121. 
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It is an impressive case Mr. Carr has built. It is a case based on 
the deterministic philosophy of history, on the type of causation which 
best answers the question: "Why did the Constituent Assembly fail?" 
There are clear examples of Mr. Carr's determinism in this section 
dealing with the Constituent Assemblyo The matter of forcing the October 
revolution into either a bourgeois-democratic or a proletari1m-socialist 
mould, when, in reality, it was a revolution in which the ;,power was 
usurped by a minority in the name of the majority, is a prime case in 
pointo The consideration of the real nature of the October revolution 
would not be compatible with the conclusions Mro Carr makes about the 
Constituent Assembly. 
Then there is Mr. Carrjs careful analysis of the vote for the as-
sembly. Was the vote potentially deceptive, as he claims, or was it a 
valid indication of the revolutionary frame of mind of the Russian people? 
To substantiate the claim that the revolution was indeed a proletarian one, 
would it not be necessary to show, logically, that the vote did register 
an obvious proletarian victory? 
And is not the paralleling of one historical situation to another good 
practice for the deterministic historian? Mr. Carr does this with his 
comparison of the French Constituent Assembly to the Russian. But is the 
French Constituent Assembly com:para.ble to the Russian? 
Mro Carr 0 s statement that an "inevitable" clash was due to develop 
between one class and an~therin Russia is in the best tradition of histori-
cal determinism, and a very necessary ingredient in the formula. he has 
worked up for the dissolution of the assembly. It legitimatizes the 
Bolshevik tactics and makes them appear to be on behalf of the "exploited 
and toiling classes~" But were the Bolsheviks concerned with the desires 
of the Russian people and did the Russian people have a. coherent idea of 
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what they were faced with? 
The laok of prestige fo~. the assembly Mr. Carr professes to see 
amongst the masses is likewise a vital part of his argument, since it 
wouJ.d hardly do for the people, who make up those sooial forces Mr. Carr 
is so oonoerned with, to have supported the assembly, thus ·~psetting the 
neat ohain of oa~sation which inexorably leads to dissolution. But was 
the attitude as Mr. Carr describes it? Did the assembly lack prestige? 
There were no alternatives to Bolshevik rule, Mr. Carr suggests, 
certainly one of the clearest detenninistio statements in Mr. Carr•s 
presentation. W~re there no alternatives simply because the Bolsheviks 
did control the capital oity? Or were there no alternatives because none 
actually presented themselves? Or do the f'aets support the contention 
that Bolshevism was indeed ·the wave of the future for Russia? What of 
democracy for Russia? Mro Carr says it had no broad support in Russia. 
But l_vhy the concern for the security of the vote to the Constituent As-
sembly? And why did t~e Bolsheviks consent to the elections if what Mr. 
Carr says is true? Mr. Carr does say the first steps of the revolution 
were taken in the name of democracy, but he is dealing largely in se-
27 mantioso 
These are the questions raised by Mr. Ca~r9 s treatment of the Con-
stituent Assembly. Before we can accept, or reject, Mr. Carr's evalu-
ation of the assembly, they must be answered. To do so, we must return 
to the bottom rung of our ladder and retrace our steps to see if they 
lead us to a different destination than Mr. Carr's. 
To determine if the October revolution was proletarian-socialist or 
bourgeois-democratic, or neither, it is necessary to know the Bolshevik 
27 Ibid., p. 109. 
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position in relation to the revolution to learn if they had a claim to 
power. We can concede that the Bolsheviks represented, for all practical 
purposes, the proletariat of Moscow and Petrograd, but Mr. Carr leaves 
the impression he considers the Bolsheviks the legitimate spokesman for 
the entire "proletariat," into which he lU111ps th~ peasantry. He also 
treats the October revolution as an Bolshevik intra-party affair. This, 
in essence, leaves the right to choose future forms of power to the 
Bolsheviks. Despite the difficulties which were to confront the Bolsheviks 
in assuming this right, d~ffiou.lties which Mr. Carr duly nQtes, the real 
dangers to their ?1UJ.e did not emerge. Nor does the manner in which Lenin 
consolidated his power. Pipes claims Mr .. Carr, in order to carry forward 
the story "generally tends to ignore or greatly minimize the anti-
Bolshevik forces both before and during the revolution."28 That these 
forces were considerable oan be illustrated by calculating the strength 
of the Bolsheviks at strategic times during the months between the March 
and the October revolution. 
In his April Theses, Lenin quite frankly admits the minority po-
29 sition of the Bolsheviks. That admission stemmed not from defeatism, 
but from a deter.mi.nation to strengthen the Bolshevik position. From that 
moment the Bolsheviks began a systematic process of building power through 
I 
temporary alliances. Always it was the Bolsheviks who emerged as 
stronger - not through any intrinsie appeal to their allies, 'but merely 
through the expedient of making each groups 9 oause their own as long as 
certain other conditions were met. Mr. Carr, like Lenin, knows that 
28Pipes, p. 2260 
29carl Landauer, European Socialism. (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1959), p... .578. · 
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numbers count in history. The progress of' the Bolshevik party by these 
means did. not necessarily mean they were abandoning any of their dogmas 
by compranising, for, throughout the time between April and the disso~ 
lution of the Constituent Assembly, all of Lenin's "compromises" were de-
signed with only one thing in mind: the ultimate and final triumph of the 
Bolsheviks. 
The progress of Marxism was less certain than that of the Bolsheviks. 
From April to June it enjoyed little sympathy. Its failure to make an 
impression on the Russ~an revolutionary scene is demonstrated by the 
elections to the First All-Russian Congress of Peasants• Deputies. Of 
the 1,115 delegates elected by all strata of the peasantl;"y, 537 were 
Social Revolutionaries, 465 were non-partisan and 103 were Social Demo-
crats, including Bolsheviks and Mensheviks)O The delegates to this 
congress voted unconditionally to support the Provisional Government and 
to refer final settlement of the land qµestion to the promised Con-
stituent Assembly. At this congress, unanimous opposition was voiced 
against the Bolshevik land program of seizure without controls. Since 
the Bolshevik program was put forward as representative of Marxian 
thinking, it can be safely asstl.med that Marxist philosophy "did not touch 
these representatives of the Russian blacklands ••• (who were) the princi-
pal force in Russian sooiety.,n3l 
During the First Conference of Factory-Shop Committees, held between 
June 12 and 16 in Petrograd, a resolution drafted by Lenin advocating the 
establishment of workers• controls over the production and distribution 
30James Bunyan and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik Revolution, (Stal:1ford, 
Calif., Stanford University Press, 19bl}, p. 9. . 
31N.N. Sukhanovt ~ Russian Revolution, 1211., Volume I, (New York: 
Harper & Bros., 1962), p. 321. 
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of goods was passed by a margin of 290 - 111. 32 Lenin's popularity was 
based on worker control of' the ecc;momic system, a program designed to ap-
peal to the workers who were asking redress from grievances. We see this 
pattern repeated time and again as Lenin secures support for the 
Bolsheviks by offering the extremist elements a rallying-point for their 
demands, even though these demands were equivalent to advocating anarchy 
and a breakdown of the economic system of the nation. And time and time 
again we see the more responsible elements, such as.the Mensheviks and 
the SRs, while advocating no less socialistic measures than the Bolshe'Viks, 
refuse to sanction the Bolshevik intent. Oftentimes these responsible 
elements sacrificed public support to principles. 
Although Lenin's program for the proletariat in June, 1917, was 
calculated to obtain support for the Bolsheviks, it was not necessarily 
the: program to which he was philosophically co:mmittede On the first 
al:'l;lliversary of the October revolution, Lenin admitted to the Sixth Congress 
of Soviets that a year earlier he had been well aware that the workers• 
control of industry would be "chaotic, shattering, primitive, incomplete. 1133 
Yet Lenin pursued this program because he knew that it was the one certain 
way to win the workers to his sideo As it became obvious the workers were 
incompetent to manage industry, Lenin retreated to a position of state 
capitalism administered by a managerial class which had come of age during 
the Tsarist era. Mr. Carr, however, says this conference was a "foretaste 
of things to come," but fails to indi;ca.te if he feels this is an example 
of Bolshevik tactics or of the acceptance of Bolshevism as the bellwether 
32:Bunyan and Fisher, p. 10., 
33Pa.ul Avrich, "The Bolshevik Revolution and Workers• Control in 
Russian Industry," ~ Slavic Review, XXII, March, 1963, p. 47. 
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for Russia.34 
If Lenin enjoyed a meas-q.re of success at this first "workers"' 
congress, it was a different story at the All-Russian Congress of Workers 
and Soldiers Deputies which opened June 16. Again, the Bolsheviks were a 
minority, holding only 105 seats out of a total. of 882, with the SRs 
holding 285 and the Mensheviks 2480 35 The major issues at stake were 
1.) whether the socialists would condescend to enter a government with 
the bourgeoisie and 2.) whether to continue the war. Both resolutions 
passed over Bolshevik p:r•otestso Mr .. Carr does tell us the Congress voted 
to support the Provisional Government but neglects to draw any conclusions 
from this action.36 The delegates were looking to the Provisional Govern-
ment not to the Bolsheviks, for answers to social ills. But why were 
they doing this, if it was true the Bolsheviks were accepted as the pro-
pone:rrts of a proletarian view7 We can better understand the reason why 
the workers and peasants a.s a whole were looking to the Provisional 
Government to solve their problems if we read Sukhanov's most illumi-
nating description of the type of delegate attending the congress. 
" • • & The Moscow worker is as different from the Petersburg proletarian 
as the hen from a. pea.cocko But even he, as familiar to me as the Peters-
burger, is not altogether benighted and homespuno Here at the Congress, 
however, the hall was filled with a crowd of a completely diffel:'ent order. 
Out of the trenches and obscure holes and corners had crept utterly crude 
and ignorant people whose devotion to the revolution was spite and despair, 
34carr~ !. ~192'.X .2f. .~2v::i-Jl_"S ~' Volume I, p. 89, 
35Per:y:y;i. Vseross~iska ~ P..2!.~ B:1§12, Moscow, 1930, I, xxvii, 
cited in Bunyan and Fisher, p. 11. 
36carr, ! Hist~r:;z of §2_~,i -~ssia, Volume I, p. 90. 
while their ~socialisma was hunger and an unendurable longing for rest 
n37 
• • & • 
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When these delegates voted down the Bolshevik ~esolution, it is un-
likely they understood the fine points of political intrigue involved. 
These delega.t,es, the true representatives of Russia, were casting their 
lot with the Prov1sionaJ. Government, the established, if confused, au-
thority because they wanted to see order come out of chaos as quickly as 
possible. In November, during the elections to the Constituent Assembly, 
this same grey mass was to repeat their faith in this approach. And this 
is what Mr. Car!' has not concluded: that, by voting to enter a government 
composed of Ka.dets, the "socialists," except for the Bolsheviks, indi-
cated a willingness to put the welfare of the people above the considera-
tions of' dogma. 
Before its adjournment, the First Congress of Sovlets elected a new 
Central Executive Corrnnittee, which held power until the October revo-
lution and was composed of 104 Mensheviks, 99 SRs, 35 Bolsheviks and 18 
others. About all that can be concluded from these, and the preceding 
figures, is that there is little to support any contentions that Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks :rep:r0esented the social forces of' Russia in June, 1917. 
It would be well here to depart for a moment from our analysis of 
Bolshevik strength and examine Mr. Car:r~s attitude toward Lenin. It is 
necessary to do this now if we are to obtain an insight into the manner by 
which Mr. Carr progresses from March to October, then to January, from the 
0 bourgeois" revolution to.the 0 ;proletarian" one and thence to the disso-
lution of the Constituent Assembly. M:r., Carr 0 s attitude toward Lenin has 
been of concern to many :reviewers~ J.B. Sheerin writes that the "personal 
admiration of Lenin makes the book jJolu:me J} potentially a dangerous 
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one o o • 1138 Florinsky says one of the three major faults of Mr. Carros 
which color his interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution is his ''worship-
ful admiration of Lenin."39 Deutscher wonders why Mro Carr ascribes to 
Lenin the sta.ture of a statesman, especially in view of the La.ttert s 
b ' ' k 1 t· t' · 40 eT,i:,er ... nown revo u ionary ac 1.vityo This would seem to place Deutscher 
in the ranks with other reviewers who deplore Mr. Carris attitude toward 
Lenin~ But such is not the case, ±'or Deutscher has rejected contentions 
that Mro Carr worships the Russian :r•evolutionary. He claims Mr. Carr is 
too "skeptical, too acute and tc,o strongly aware of Lenins s inconsistencies 
to be his worshippero n41 Deutscher says Mr. Carr admires Lenin the state-
builder not the state-destroyerQ But this recognition of the positive as-
pect of Lenin9 s nature cannot explain why Mr. Carr choses to ignore Lenin9 s 
revolutionary tactics in the destruction of the Constituent Assembly, nor 
his neglect of the destructive process· involved when Lenin refused to con-
tribute ariything to the construction of a state until power was resting 
securely in Bolshev;i.k hands. Since Deutscher wrote without benefit of 
access to Mr .. Carr0 s stated philosophy of history, his work does not tell 
us why the omissicms a.re ma.de.. But, according to What 1.§. !_Iisto;;x?, it is 
obvious that Lenti:r1 is J:'.'egarded by Mro Carr as the agent of force over 
which he had no control other• than to direct them into preselected channels. 
It seems, then, that Mr. Carr is not particularly impressed with the 
role of the conscious individual in histo:ryo He is not. "It defies all 
the evidence to suggest that history can be written on the basis of 
38J$Bo Sheerin, Review of! Hi.§~ of.:. Sovi~ _Ep.ssia., Volume I, !.1?& 
Bols_hevik _Revolution, ;J.2J-'7 ... 12,gJ, by· E. H. Carr, Q..@!h.9.lic World, CLmII, 
May, 1951, Po 15b. 
39Flo!'insky, p. 2860 
4-0 ' 
Deutscher, Po 20'7. 
41Ibid. 
'explanations in terms of ~uman intentions, 0 or of accounts of their 
motives given by the actors themselves, why, in their own estimation, 
they acted as they did," he writes.42 
The facts of history are not about actions of indi-
viduals performed in isolation, and not about the motives, 
real or imaginary, .from which individuals suppose them-
selves to have acted. They are facts about the relations 
of individuals to one another in a society and about the 
social forces which produce from the actions results often 
at variances with, and sometimes, opposite to, the results 
which the individuals themselves intended.43 
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Mr. Carr £eels that the historian is called upon to investigate what 
lies behind the act and.that the conscious thought or motives of the indi-
vidual may be quite irrelevanto He is :f'ully aware that it was Lenin who 
moulded the forces which brought him to powero 44 But for even this 
technique·· to have succeeded, it was necessary that the social forces be 
present, if in flux. To that extent, at least, Lenin must have been an 
expression of the prevailing social forces, if we are to hold 'With Mr. 
Carr•s theory. But the social forces were demanding not necessarily 
change of direotion, but merely a speed-up in the realization of reforms. 
The elections to the Constituent Assembly amply prove this point, inasmuch 
as the Kadets (who had been responsible for the foot ... dragging) were left 
out of the victor's column, while the .SRs (those advocating reform rather 
than overthrow) captured the largest vote. Could it be that what Mr. 
Oarr reaJ.l.y means is that, in actuality, Lenin rode to power on the baoks 
of the frustrated proletariat and the peasants, held aloft by the power 
\" 
of his intelleot and vision and single-mindedness? "Wha.t seems to me 
42 
Carr, ~ ,!! HistoIT?, Po 64. 
43Ibid. 
44rbid., p. 68. 
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essential is to recognize in the great man an outstanding individual who 
is at once the repres.entative and the creator of soeial forces which 
change the shape of the world and the thoughts of man, 11 writes Mr. Carr. 45 
Under this philosophy of history a great man, a leader, such as Lenin, 
r'Ules not through any virtue of his personality, although that may help 
him :ma.intain power, bu.t cmly because soeiety allows him.. The leader is 
the product of social forces which perpetuate his existence, and when the 
social forces no longer wish him to reign, they, and they alone, will 
topple him. When Mr. Carr m--ites that the October revolution had broken 
forever the democratic mould and that nothing could have put it together 
a.gain, he leaves Lenin no ch9ice except to justifiably proceed to the 
dissolution of the last vestige of democratic power. 
Mr. Carr has moulded Lenin into a social force, an expression of 
society. But is it necessarily a tru.e mou.ld? It is dii'f'icult to measure 
to what extent a man and his philosophy are incarnations of some histori-
' 
cal force. About the only real standard ·of measurement applicable is the 
one Mro Carr uses: to what extent was the man, or the philosophy, success-
ful? Social forces themselves involve vague, indefinable processes which 
can be viewed, perhaps, only in retrospect and only with the advantage of 
time. Yet Mr@ Carr has claimed that Lenin took the social forces and 
moulded thexn. into his concept of the state. This implies that the social 
forces existent were available to Lenin to do with what he could. Since 
the Bolsheviks did p:r.evail, there can be little question that their will 
to survive was greater than that of the other parties, who, in effect, 




It is necessary to remember above all else that Lenin was a oonsoious 
agent of the revolution, plying an ancient and respected trade.in Russia. 
He fits into a definite and determinable revolutionary pattern and tra-
dition, a point Mr. Carr does not emphasize. Lenin was a revolutionary 
who worked himself into a psychological and even intellectual position in 
which he identified himself with the proletariat with whom he had no real 
economic or psychological connection other than his acceptance and inter-
pretation of Marx. Lenin never thought he represented the majority. He 
was going to make a revolution and then ram its fruits down their throat. 
The point is that to Mr. Carr it makes little difference to distinguish 
between the intentions of one man, a group of men or a desperate mob. 
What happened did happen and there is little reason to justify it morally 
or to attempt to find alternatives. 
But Mr. Carr overlooks one important aspect of the kind of control 
Lenin advocated: a highly centralized dictatorship. Beyond a single 
sentence, which, if lifted out of context, would seem to indicate that 
Mr. Carr knows something of the traditional statist outlook of the 
Russian people, there is nothing in his treatment of the revolution that 
woul.d lead one to believe Mr. Carr is aware that the concept of the highly 
centralized state is a real and very potent social force within Russia. 
From the days of the .Golden Horde, and before, when they united under a 
central authority for security, the Russian people have looked upon 
centralization of state control as a :mixed blessingo But Mr. Carr does 
not include this concept of the state in his ingredients necessary for 
Lenin's success. That the Bolshevik rule is merely an extension of the 
type of rule exercised by the Tsars is readily seen when one compares the 
systems. 
With this undel'~tanding of Mr. Carr's attitude toward Lenin and a 
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quick glance at the social forces present in Russia at the time of the 
October revolution, we can return to our exarr.dnation of the strength of 
the Bolsheviks as reflected in elections to the many conferences held be-
tween March and January. Following the First Congress of Soviets, the 
next majo.r indication of the BolsheviksQ strength ... which was undeniably 
growing all the time, largely because the other parties had failed to de-
liver anything to the Russian people and the Bolshevlks promised to de.,. 
liver everything - ca:rn.e at the Third All~Russian Conference of Trade 
; 
Unions, which met in Petrograd Jul,y 4-11046 Of the 220 delegates, the 
Bolsheviks could count on 80, with the remaining combined into a loose 
coalition containing Mensheviks, SRs and trade unionists. The issues here 
centered around one point: state control of industry versus worker control. 
The latter was advocated by the Bolsheviks and was, as at the workers 
congress of the previous week, defeatedo The Bolsheviks, however, fared 
better on the executive committee of the Central Council of Trade Unions 
than they did at the Congress of Soviets, sharing power with the Mensheviks. 
46 
The best indication of the growing dissatisfaction with the elements 
compl"ising the P-.co·ITfsional Gover'nment and the consequent strengthening of 
the Bolshev1k position1 is shown in the drift of public opinion in the 
Petrogra.d and Moscow municipal elections. It must be :remembered that these 
two cities were the st1:>ongholds of Bolshevism. But the drift of public 
opinion and support away from the Ka.dets and other "liberal" elements does 
demonst:i:•ate public discontent wj,th the manner in which the nation was being 
run .. The Bolsheviks in Petrograd registered o:nly 183,694 votes in municipal 
elections of September 2, 1917, but had climbed to 415,587 on the November 
2.5 Constituent Assen1bly electionso The SRs had declined approximately 
.50,000 votes, but the Kadets, because of the regard for the Constituent 
Assembly, showed a healthy gain. However, the percentage of the Kadet 9 s 
gain was not nearly as great as the Bolsheviks. Between July 8 and De-
cember 2-4 (latter dates are the dates of the elections to the Constituent 
Assembly in Moscow), the Bolshev'i.ks 'Oicked up 36 per cent in Moscow., The 
Kadets showed a gain of 22 per cent, d1:1,e pi•imarily to the fa.ct that SRs 
dropped 50 per cent, their voters having gone over to the Kadets to show 
their contempt for the Bolsheviks~ seizure of power. The Kadets had pre-
viously shown a decline of about 10 per cent as reflected in the municipal 
elections of October 3 in Moscowo F'igures are from ~,2h~ ~t No .. 2, 
November 30, 1917, p. 2. and Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 257, December 7, 1917, 
p. 2, cited in Bunyan and Fisher, 'p'7"'3Tm:-
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The Bolsheviks, by maintaining their position on workers' control of in-
dustry, were, in the face of growing disorders, beginning to strike a 
responsive chord in the wc,,rkers, even if they failed this time to secure 
passage of their resolution. 
At almost the same time the trade unionists were meeting, the All-
Russian Conference of Bolshevik Military Organizations met to serve 
notice to the Provisional Government that at least 26,000 soldiers were 
ready to st~nd behind the Bolsheviks. 47 The soldiers' enthusiasm for the 
Bolsheviksj who were promising ·peacej can be traced to a lack of en-
thusi~sm for the front. Again, Lenin was merely promising to give po-
tential followers what they wanted. 
Mr. Carr does not concern himself with either of these meetings, 
preferring to concentrate on the July days and the Sixth Party Congress. 
The resolutions of this party congress, formulated while Lenin was in 
hiding in Finland, were a. formal accusation directed toward the social-
ists who did not follow the Bolshevik lead in the attempt to wrest power 
from the Provisional Goverrunento These socialists were declared to be 
tools of the bourgeoisie and hence counter=revolutionary. Mro Carr re-
cords the fact that there were many at the congress who disagreed with 
this indictmento Even so, he g:i:'iTes precedence to the arguments advanced 
by Stalin 9 who said 9 (repeating Trotsky), that Russia may be the country 
which points the way to socialism and that all who parleyed with the 
"bourgeoisie" forces were hindering the progress toward socialism. There 
seems little inclination on MI'o Carr's part to speculate on the alterna-
tive: i.e., that Russia may not have been ready for the socialist revo-
lution which Stalin foresaw. 
47Bu.nyan and Fisher, p. 14. 
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Because of the Korrrl.lov affair,48 the continual desertion from the 
front, the plunder of once-great estates and the apparent helplessness 
of the Provisional Government to do anything about this state of affairs, 
Mr. Carr feels the conditions for the .second stage 1 of the revolution -
the Bolshevik stage = were "ma:tu:ring fast. n49 But were they? What was 
maturing was dissatisfaction 'With the way things were going, not any 
widespread acceptance of the Bolshevik programo If the Bolshevik "star 
was rising rapidly," it was not because of any understanding of their 
program, but because they "promised everything.u And for a party to 
seize power m1der the auspices of fulfilling whatever society demands 
the program. through which this would be achieved must be understood, or 
at least have been made available to the sooietyo It is difficult to as-
sume the grey masses Sukhanov speaks of as having understood the Bolshe-
vik programo It is more accurate to assume the peasant understood little 
little other than hunger and fatigue~ 
Still, by August 8, the Bolshevik party could claim direct repre-
sentation of 177,000 members in 112 organizationso50 This strength was 
revealed at the Sixty Party Congress, and represented a potent force to 
be reckoned wit.ho It did not 9 however, represent the consensus of the 
Russian people. 
The Kornilov affair finall;y brought home to the Provisional Govern-
ment the fact that running the nation without the acti-ve participation 
of the soeialist parties would be tantamount to committing political 
48By August, 1917, the rightist G~neral Kornilov attempted a ~o~-
49eta1 by marching on Petrograd~ He was repulsed~ 
49carr, fl History .2!, §}:>vi~i Rt1ssia, Volume I, p. 93. 
50Btlnyan and Fisher, p. 19. 
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suicide. But it was already too late. Aware of the weakened position of 
the Provisional Government, the executive committee of the Workers and 
Soldiers Deputies and the executive committee of the Peasants' Deputies 
issued a call on September 16 for a democratic congress to assemble for 
the purpose of setting up a truly representative form of government which 
would direct the course of the nation until the Constituent Assembly had 
completed its work. When it met, the Bolshevi.ks were again a hostile 
minority. At first, attempts to include the bourgeois representatives in 
any government to be formed were voted downo Bu.t, without the Kadets, 
the moderate socialist parties felt the new cabinet would not be truly 
representative. On October 3, a compromise was reached and Kerensky formed 
a new government including ten socialists, four Kadets and two non-party-
aligned men. For the first time, th~ nation seemed to have a basis for 
a stable governmento Representation was better proportioned according to 
the actual political situation and, even though th~.Bolsheviks did not 
participate, it appeared this democratic government could reconcile dis-
sideri._t viewpoints. Yet it was to prove too little and too late. And so 
Mr. Carr calls this new government, which was inching toward true repre-
sentation~ a "wordy fiasco.,"51 
It was also at this meeting that the first concrete steps toward 
convening a Constituent Assembly were takeno A Pre-Parliament was formed, 
made up of representatives of the groups at the democratic congress. The 
Bolsheviks were a minority and withdrew from the Pre=Parliament, unwilling 
to participate in it as they were in the congress which preceded it. This 
continual refusal to compromise on solid issues points up the deceit of 
the Bolsheviks' compromises -with organizations whose aid they solicited • 
.51carr, ! Histoey E£ Soviet 1E1ss~, Volume I, p., 920 
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The Bolsheviks were destined to walk out of many meetings as a part of 
their tactics. By standing aloof from the mistakes of the parties en~ 
joying public support and sympathy, the Bolsheviks could claim they had 
no part in whatever failure occurred as a result of the mistakes. That 
by refusing to cooperate they did nothing constructive during this period 
is evident. Mr., Car:t' does not explo1•e this negative aspect of the Bolshe-
viks O acti vl ties; indeed, he reserves for Le:nin the label "creative. 11 ' 2 
' As the Bolsheviks agitated louder and longer for "A:lJl Power to the 
~oviets /' and. "Land, BrE3ad and. Peace," their adherents grew more numerouso 
On October 24~ the day before the Bolshevik revolution, _the unofficial 
r ,.. ,' ' ·~~. ·~ , ·- • 
Congress of Soviets of the Northern Region and the All-Russian:Congress 
of Factory Shop Committees approved a Bolshevik takeover of the govern-
ment.53 The Petrograd Soviet followed suito But the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee of Workers and Soldiers Soviet, which, despite Bolshe-
vik claims they were out of touch with their constituents, still remained 
the most representative body in Russia, voted down the Bolshevik resolu-
tion to transfer all power to the Soviets under Bolshevik domination (the 
leading Soviets of Petrogra.d and Moscow). This is the clearest indica-
tion that at the time of the seizu!'e of power, the Bolsheviks were re-
garded with open hostility by the elected representatives of a substantial 
majority,, The vast majority of Soviets were not under the do:m.ination of 
the Bolsheviks o Several did not fall to the Bolsheviks until well after the 
Civil War., To some degree, the executive committee was out of touch with 
its constituents. But their position, if slightly more to the right than 
52carr, }:lli,at 1E_ Ili~_;t;,01::2:}, p. 68.. Mr~ Carr is speaking of Lenin's 
"creativeness" in moulding the social forces to his own will • 
.53:aabochii ~, No o 42, November 6 ( October 24), 1917, p. 3, ci t~d 
in Bunyan and Fisher, p .. 67. The date October 24 corresponds to November 
6, since the Russian calendar was, prior to February, 1918, thirteen days 
behind the Weste~n calendar. We have used the Russian Gregorian calendar 
in this work. · 
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was the prevailing attitude of the nation at the time, was vindioated at 
the Second Congress of Sovietso The delegates to this congress, which was 
composed of every shade of political thought in Russia, were the first to 
learn of the Bolshevik revolution. They reacted to the news by beginning 
the policy of dissassociation which was to leave the Bolsheviks in power 
in the Soviets. Mro Carr considers the Bolshevik=dominated Soviets as 
the ~natural, if self~oonstituted heirsn54 to a government which su.r-
rendered.55 
The moderate socialists left the congress, as did the peasants depu-
tieso56 Again, we turn to .Sukhanov to provide us with an insight into 
what desertion of the congress by these moderate (Sukhanov calls them 
. Rightist) groups meant to the future course of history. Here is his ao .. 
count: 
If' the Mensheviks and SRs left now 9 they would simply 
write finis to themselves and infinitely strengthen thei!" 
opponentso One would have thought the Right wouldn't do 
this immediately, and that the Congress, though with a 
wavering majority, would be set on the right road to the 
formation of a united democratic front. But the Mensheviks 
and SRs did do it. These blind ceunter ... revolutionaries not 
only failed to see that their 9line• was counter ... revolutionary, 
but also failed to realize the complete absurdity and un-
worthy childishness of their behavior.ooo A struggle at the 
Congress for a united democratic front might have had some 
successo For the Bolsheviks as such, for Lenin and Trotsky, 
it was more odious than the possible Committees of Public 
Safety or another Kornilov march on Petersburg. The exit of 
the llpure-in,,..heart 0 freed the Bolsheviks from this danger .. 
By quitting the Congress and leaving the Bolsheviks with 
only the Left SR youngsters and the feeble little NovaY! 
. Zhizn group, we gave the Bolsheviks with our own hands a 
monopoly of the Soviet, of the masses, and of the revolutionD 
By our own irrational decision we ensured the victory of 
Lenin's whole 'line., 957 
54':rhe phrase is Mr .. Carr~so 
55Geo:rg von Rauch, !, History: ,2! Soviet Russia, (New York: Frederick 
A. Praeger, 1957), p., 60o . 
.56vtorio Vserossiiskii ~ Sovetov, ~, pp .. 37-44, cited in 
Bunyan and Fisher, PPo lll.~112 .. 
57sukhanov, pp., 637-646. 
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This theory, if it can be ea11ed such, is a well-established one and 
will come as no surprise to the student of Soviet affairs. But what is 
surprising is that Mr. Carr says only that the Second Congress of Soviets 
."proclaimed the transfer of all power throughout Russia to Soviets of 
Workers~ Soldiersv and Peasants 9 Deputies.".58 It must be remembered, too, 
that even in transferring control to the Soviets, the congress was not 
necessarily transferring control to the Bolsheviks, for the provincial 
Soviets were often autonomous.59 But of this, and of the price of demo-
craoy which disassociation cost, Mr. Carr says nothing. 
On October 26, the Committee to Save the Country and the Revolution 
was for'I!led of groups who opposed the Bolshevik seizure of power. These 
included such groups as the City Duma, the Central Executive Committee of 
Soviets of Workers' and S,oldiers • Deputies, the SRs, the Mensheviks who 
left the congress, the Railway Mens• Union, the Post and Telegraph Union, 
the Central Executive Committees of the SRs and the Mensheviks, the Cou.noil 
of the Russian ·Republic, and various organizations ·from the front.60 A 
formidable array it was, but one already destined for the "rubbish-can of 
history," because it was one day too. late to form a solid front against_ 
the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were on their way toward consolidation of 
power and in so doing were receiving help and comfort from the actions of 
their opponents. The more moderate elements finally divested themselves 
entirely of any claim to power when on November 17, 1917, the SRs brpke 
with the Bolsheviksa This break also had the effect of casting more doubt 
' 8carr, -! Histor,r 2!, .§pviet Russig, Volume I, p. 99 • 
.59George Vernadsky, ! Histo_n .2.! ~, (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 19.57), p. 297. · 
6o~ lia:r:,oda, No .. 190, November 9/0otober 26, 1917, p. 2, cited in 
Bunyan and Fisher, p. 118,. 
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on Bolshevik claims that they represented the social forces within Russia, 
and this doubt wouJ.d not be lessoned until the Left SRs made their peace 
with the Bolsheviks at the "special" Congress of Peasants' Soviets. 
But even this "special" congress is not altogether an accurate re-
flection of the Bolshevik strength because of the manner in which it was 
called and convened. The Left SRs called for this special meeting of 
the Pe1;1,sants O Soviets on Novemb(if: 23, against the will of the Executive 
Committee of the First Congress of Peasants* Soviets which had been 
elected in July and claimed prior rights to represent the peasantry. 
That many delegates duly elected by the peasantry turned up at the 
special congress can be attributed more to an unwillingness to miss ~ny-
thing than to a willingness to be led by the Bolsheviks. The likelihood 
of being led by the Bolsheviks seemed remote when the vote was counted. 
The Left SRs obtained 19.5 seatsll th~ Right SRs, 65, and the Bolsheviks, 
370 61 The Left SRs supposedly were the spokesmen for the "poor" peasant .. 
ry, or those who had benefited least from the March revolution, while the 
Right SRs represented the more moderate e~ements, meaning those who saw 
hope for the future, and the Bolsheviks represented the extreme, or those 
who not only had not benefited from the change but who also demanded 
inrmediate confiscation of the estateso At this special congress the Left 
SRs and the Bolsheviks worked for a coalition which would makes them the 
spokesmen for the peasants represented at this special congress~ As far 
as representing those peasants whose delegates had boycotted the congress 
on the grounds that it was not properly called, Mr. Carr says nothing. 
The Bolshevik desire for a coalition had its foundation in the suppo-
sition that it would legitimize their takeover of power, even though the 
61Bunyan and Fisher, P~ 2100 
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Left SRs represented only a fraction of the total SR strength. The 
problem blocking a coalition centered around the manner in which land 
taken forcibly from landlords would be distributed. In May, the First 
Congress of Peasants• Soviets had gone on record as favoring the transfer 
of requisitioned estates to a land committee in each locality which was 
to oversee the use of the land until a Constituent Assembly had decided 
how it should be divided. The procrastination of the Provisional Govern-
ment disturbed the peasants, bu.t, even so, they, through their representa-
tives, sought a more lasting and orderly solution to the agrarian problem 
than the one advanced by the Bolsheviks. While the immediate Bolshevik 
program would have :fJermi.tted the peasants to seize the estates for what-
ever use they wanted (a program designed to appeal to the peasantry), 
Lenin was philosophically committed to an agrarian collectivization which 
later characterized the Stalin era. Just as in the case of the workers, 
to whom he offered control of the industry of the nation, Lenin was offer-
ing the peasants a quick solution to their illse How enduring a solution 
it would have provided is 'another matter., 
But the Left SRs spotted this f'law in the Bolshevik programo They 
accused the Bolshev.tks of not caring how the land problem was solved, just 
that it be solvedc 62 And this obstacle had to be removed before the 
Bolsheviks and the Left SRs could.fo1'tll a coalitiono Lenin was too shrewd 
to put forth the idea of collectivization, for the Left SRs were adamant 
in their insistence they would never tolerate a. dictatorship of the 
proletariat~ Miss Rochester, although an admirer of Lenin's agrarian 
program, admits that Lenin would never have been successful in forming a 
62John Reed, ~ Days 1h!.i Shoo~ ~ World, (New York: Random House, 
1936), p. 302 .. 
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coalition with the SRs if his true intent for Russian agriculture had been 
known. This realization forced Lenin temporarily to abandon his plan and 
advocate leaving the solution of the agrarian problem to the peasants.63 
Yet even this much of a retreat was not enough for the Left SRs, who felt 
Lenin9 s decrees would lead to a state of anarchy. And, too, there was a 
matter of ethics involved. The Left SRs claimed the Bolsheviks had stolen 
the agrarian platform, originated by the SRs (distribution of the estates 
among the peasantry, not to be confused with collectivization) but had 
departed from their tactics. Kolchinsky I a Left SR, claimed that the 
Bolsheviks departed from SR' tactics because they wanted to hasten the 
solution to the land question so the Consti tueht Assembly would have 
nothing to·.do., 64 . These considei-a.tions o:(' practi~al p9lit:!,.cs a.re.\m.issing 
from Mr. Carr's treatment of the oongre~s~ 
The differences in viewpoint seemed irreconcilaore·and it appeared 
that the Bolsheviks would not be able to draw peasant support to their 
revolution. But Lenin went backwards even further. He submitted en-
tirely to the Left SR program and renounced any intention of creating a 
proletarian dictatorship over the peasants, declaring his party wanted 
nothing more than to welcome the peasants as brothers of the revolution. 
How truthful he was can be demonstrated by the type of compromises he made 
with other factions. But, regardless of his intentions, his immediate 
purpose was served: the Left SRs agreed to form, a coalition, and thus a 
small segment of society seemed to stand behind the October revolution. 
For Lenin this support. seemed to have cost him dearly, if we ignore the 
behind-the-scenes nature of his compromise. He had been forced to 
63Anna Rochester, Lenin En the Agraria,ll 99:estion, (New York: Inter-
national Publishers, 191j.'.2), pp. 91-99. 
6LJ.aeed, p. 302. 
subordinate his collective ideas to that of a petty-bourgeois peasant ap-
proaoh to socialism and had accepted the program of nationalization 
offered by the Left SRs. Rochester apologizes for this saorifioe by 
rationalizing that there was a need to allow the development of capital-
., 
istio-style farms because it was the first step in.breaking the feudal 
grip of the large landowners on the peasantry.65 Yet even this coalition 
with the Left SRs was not wholly indicative of the peasant position. A 
final demonstration of peasant dissatisfaction with the direction of 
events, and a condemnation of the coalition reached between the Bolsheviks 
and the Left SRs, came between December 9 and Christmas Day, during the 
Second Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies. A resolution was 
. 66 
passed 360-321 condemning the policy of the Bolsheviks. It was the 
last word to be heard from the peasantry as an independent force, for 
the Bolsheviks quietly took over the buildings of the peasants• organi-
zations, el:illlinating them as effective communications tools with the 
people of the soil. Mr. Carr sheds no light on Lenin's relationship .with 
the peasant, and his work is barren of any reference to the manner in 
which the coalition between the Left SRs and the Bolsheviks was formed. 
FrO!ll. the foregoing it is clear that Lenin and the Bolsheviks did not 
represent a majority force 'Within the socialist ranks and that they 
seized power while a minorityo Lenin°s eonoept of party organization 
certainly demonstrated its effectiveness, but the success enjoyed through 
force of arms is in no way an assurance the social foroes were receptive 
to a dictatorship of the proletariat. Von Rauch says it best: 11 ••• it 
is pure fiction to maintain that it was the workers who took over the 
65aoohester, Po 108. 
66Bunyan and Fisher, p. 2180 
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government the day of the October Revolution. It was the Bolshevik party 
which, in the ~azne of the working class but in reality over its head had 
usurped power."67 
But this is just the "fiotion" Mr. Carr regards as fa.ct. He writes: 
Politically, Leninas argument could hardly be refuted. The 
October revolution had settled the question for good or ill. 
Whether the bourgeois revolution had been oompleted or not, 
whether the time was or was not ~lpe for the proletarian 
revolution ... and whatever the ·ultimate consequences· .if these 
questions had to be answered in the negative sense - the 
proletarian re·volution had in fact occurred. After October, 
1917, nobody could undo what had been done or force the 
revolution back into a bourgeois-democratic mould. Politi-
cal deve~opment seemed to have outrun economic development. 
This was indeed 1;,he ,assumption which Lenin made on the eve 
of October e • 0 68 
In addition to considering the October revolution a proletarian one, 
• 
Mr. Carr makes the assumption that the revolution was also a prelude to 
socialism. Mr. Carr0 s willingness to believe this is not shared by other 
historianso In the structural sense, Vernadsky refers to the takeover of 
power as a dictatorship of the Communist party, just as von Rauch does, 
and says that it was only after the Bolsheviks seized power in the capital 
that they could extend control to the provinces (a fact Mr. Carr attri-
butes to the "rule" that villages alw;a.ys follow the oity in revolution.)69 
In the broad social and political prespective, Rostow believes that had 
not the war interfered and had not the social conditions been what they 
were Russia might well have been moving toward the kind of de.t11ocratic 
institutions the.Western world could easily recognizeo?O Alfred Levin 
67 6 von Rauch, Po O. 
68carr, ! History S!i, Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 122 .. 
69vernadsky, p •. 294. 
70Rostow, Levin, et ~ pp. 34-35. 
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believes that.had not there been a combination of factors, including the 
war and. the unbelievably inept rule of the Romanovs, some resurgence of 
the monarchy might have been possible.71 While this is all speculation, 
and falls in that category of "might-p.ave'bee:n" thinki;ng,·.it nonethe-· · · .. 
less serves to point out that the foundations for a proletarian revo-
lution may not have existed. If the proietarian revolution did in fact 
occur, it was because Lenin made it occur. The truth is that when Lenin 
arrived at the Finland Station in April he brought with him the prole-
' . 
tarian-socialist revolutiono The most surprised of all were his 
followers. Mr. Carr has an excellent description of the controversy 
which Lenin's April Theses caused amid the party members,72 but he neither 
notes the realities of the situation in which there was actually little 
basis to assume a socialist revolution was in the making, nor does he 
allow much validity to the arguments of those who maintained the revo-
lution had only entered its bourgeois stage. For those who supposed the 
March revolution was largely spontaneous, Mr. Carr does not even record 
Lenin's scorn. All that is important to Mr. Carr is that Lenin did 
triumph and his Apl"il Theses carried the day, "giving concrete shape and 
a constitutional mould to the Bolshevik scheme of revolution. 1173 
Mr. Carr~s observation that political development seemed to have 
outrun economic development74 would seem to evidence a concern over 
Marxian precepts and how they were fa:t•ing under Lenin9 s direction. F oC. 
71Alfred Levin, Stillwater, Oklahoma, letter, February 16, 1963, to 
the author. 
72carr, fl History.£! Soviet Russia, Volume I, pp. 78-84. 
73Ibid., p. 84. 
74Ibid., p. 36. 
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Barghoorn calls this preoooupation with embodying Mar.xist doctrines in 
Soviet institutions "the prineipal defect" in Mr. Carr's work because it 
keeps him from drawing the proper oonolusions about aertain as.pacts of 
Bolshevik rule, namely the fa.ct that the revolution was not progressing 
along any recognizable ideological lines.75 
One way Mro Carr could contribute to.the sense of inevitability 
·which runs through Volume One is to claim the revolution was prooeeding 
along Marxian lines., It was not and he does not. Mr. Carr is fully 
aware of the damage the revolution did to Marxist dootrines.76 But, be,.. 
yond an explanation of how Lenin justified his dictatorship, Mr. Carr is 
not interested in reoonoiling the Marxist tradition with the Bolshevik 
methods. His efforts are not directed toward describing the develoJ;111ent 
of an ideology into a· working set of principles,·· nor even toward justi-
fying the activities of the Bolsheviks in terms of Marxian dio~ates. For 
Mr. Carr, Marxism is simply ane more tool the Bolsheviks had in their 
storeroom of revolution. 
Considering this, it seems strange that A.L. Rowse would see in Mr. 
Carr an ideologist wlw has shown how the doctrine or Marxism aoquired a 
new force in the Nineteenth century and became the ideology of a group of 
intellectuaJ.s ~onoerned with maintaining their identity by linking their 
interest with the interests of the community.as a whole.77 Bllt, en the 
other hand, Rowse says Mr. Carr is not a Marxist and therefore could not 
75F .c. Ba.rghoo:rn, Revie)N of ! History.!!, Soviet Russia, Volume I, 
The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-~, by E.H. Carr, ~ Saturda.:y; Review·of 
Literature, XXXIV, March 17, 19.51, p. 21. ·• · 
76carr, ! HistOE.,I 2£_ Soviet Russia., Volume I, p. 123. 
77A.L. Rowse, "Questions in Political Theory on E.H. Carr," E!E . .2! 
~ Epoch, (London: Ma.omillan, 1947), p. 292. 
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write the kind of historical inquiry Deutscher says might be revealing: 
that of a Marxist writing a· history of the Soviet state. Mr. Carr, 
writes Deutscher, stands "au dela de la melee.,"78 If Mr. Carr cannot be .....___..._.,...,.........,.;;;,;;,,,;;. 
considered a Marxist or a student or Mar:xism, outside of its effect on 
policies and institutions, then one cannot look to his work for a criti-
cal analysis of Marxism as it affected the Bolshevik rule. There is not 
even an attempt to do so. 
Because of this there arises a paradox. Why is it that we cannot 
expect from a writer who has built his reputation partly upon works con.. 
oerning Rus~i~n revolutionaries that he include in his most comprehensive 
work a chapter or at least a section on Marxism as it pertains to the 
,, 
Russian revolution? It seems a strange oversight, if it is an oversight. 
Perhaps a closer inspection of these earlier works can provide us with a 
key to unlock this paradox., 
Although his 12,Qstoveskx was called a "standard," and was favorably 
received by the majority of reviewers, there are some notable dissenters. 
Babette Deutsch, a literary critic for the Boston Transcript, said that 
Mr. Carr did not realize the full measUJ:'.'e of the man. 79 Malcollll Richards, 
a critic for the New York !Yening ~, wrote that Mr. Carr might as well 
be unaware of the psychological, moral and religious questions Dostovesky 
raisea.80 And J.W. !Crutch, writing in ,1'h! Nation, seems to think 
81 Dostovesky was never met on his own ground. 
78oeutseher, p. 204. 
79Babette Deutsch, Review of Dostoevsky, by E.H. Carr, in Books of 
the Boston Transcript, November 1, 1931, p. 5. 
80MaJ.oolm .Richards, Review of Dostoevsky, by E.H. Carr, in the New 
York Evening~, October 31, 1931, p. 9. 
81J.W. Kruteh, Review of Dostoevslg, by E.H. Carr, in The Nation, 
November 4, 1931, CXXXI, p .. 490. ' · -
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Of Mr. Carr's Bakunin, generally the same criticisms are leveled. 
Franz Hoellering in!.~ ~tion wrote that the book "is as precise as a 
timetable and tells little more about an exceptional and important his-
toric personality than a train timetable tells about the complexity of a 
railroad. 1182 Edmund Wilson's criticism is that Mr. Carr tells all but 
"what it is all about."83 
~ Romantic ~ by Mr. Carr fa~ed little better. Isidor 
. , .... 
Schneider, writing in~ Nation, says the revolutionary activity that 
could be vi\ally infonning to us is "idly glanced at and ignored while 
our attention i~ diverted to trivial love affairs. 1184 ~ Saturday ~-
~ 2.f Literature says of Mr. Carr's Studies· .·3:!! Revolution that it is a 
"pleasing but sketchy primer on the march of revolutionary theory in the 
last century. 1185 
There runs through a substantial portion of the reviews of Mr. Carr's 
works on revolution and revolutionaries this recurring criticism sug. 
gesting that he has. not grasped the idealism, or the motivating forces, 
behind revolution. Perhaps a large part of this failure to see beyond 
what actually occurred s.tems from Mr. Carr's distaste for Utopias. Ac-
cording to him, ''the complete Utopian, by rejecting the causal sequence, 
deprives himself of the possibility of.understanding either the reality 
which he is seeking to change or the processes by which it can be changed. 
82Franz Hoellering, Review of Bakunin, by E.H. Carr, in The Nation, 
November 4, 1931, CXXXI, p., 358. - . -
83Edmund Wilson, "Cold Water on Bakunin," in Shores E£ Light (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1938), pp. 716-721. 
84Isidor Schneider, Review of The Romantic Exiles, by E.H. Carr, 
The Nation, CXXXVII, August 9, 1933~. 164. 
85Review of Studies in Revolution, by E.H. Carr, Saturday Review .2f. 
Literature, XXXIII, Augustl9, 1950, p. 36. 
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Too much realism, on the other hand, can lead to sterility, since the 
realist analyses a predetermined course of development which he is power-
less to change," writes Mr. Carr. 86 But for all his understanding of the 
pitfalls of a totally empirical outlook, Mr. Carr regards himself as more 
a realist than a Utopian. For Professor Carr, history is a science. If 
the historian finds himself em~edded in the stream of history, then the 
path of "objectivity" lies not only in finding facts but in managing to 
assess them in the face of the limitation placed on his vision by his own 
timeo 
There is yet another indication that Mr. Carr, despite his apparent 
intimacy with revolution, finds it repugnant and is loath to dwell on it. 
Deutscher writes that Mr. Carr is a sometime despiser of revolutionary 
ideas and principles, and illustrates his point well with Mr. Carr's 
treatment of the Brest-Litovsk,talks. 87 And it is necessary only to turn 
to the table of contents to catch a glimpse of what was on Mr. Carr's 
mind when he wrote the first volume on his history series. Part One 
totals 70 pages and professes to take us from the foundations of Bolshe-
vism directly to the October revolutiono That part is entitled "The Man 
and the Instrument," and is followed by "The Constitutional Structure.If 
This second part deals with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, 
the Constitution of the RSFSR, Consolidating the Dictatorship, the As-
cendency of the Party and the Party and the State. The chapter on the 
constitution, which innned~ately follows Mro Oa.rr•s description of the 
dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, has special significance for it 
86E.H. Carr, The 1'wenty Years Crisis, 1919-!2.:22, (New York: St. 
Martins, 1946), p.16. . · 
87Deutscher, p. 212. 
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displays admirably his tendency to attach importance to the trappings of 
democracy even though they are likely to be hollow shams. The lengthy 
chapter on the constitution, which is important only in the doctrinaire 
way it pays tribute to traditional revolutionary goals, sheds no light on 
the forces creating the revolution or on the way in which it developed. 
This sketchy treatment of the revolution and the manner in which Mr. 
Carr handles it can best be explained by e:x:amining the premise of his 
work. Mr. Carr is not telling the story of a state being built upon 
ideological maxims, nor is he chronicling the purely revolutionary force 
of communism. His purpose is the consideration of oolllI!lunism as an economic 
and political force largely characterized by a return to the normal pur-
suits of statecraft. ' I Perhaps thi·s is another reason why Lenin emerges as 
a statepuilder9 rather than a state-destroyer, in Mr. Carr's estimation. 
Mr. Oarr0s purpose with his work is clearly stated in the preface to his 
first volume G "My ambition,~· he .writes, "has been to write the history 
not of the events of the revolution ••• , but of the political, social 
88 . 
and economic order which emerged from it." He £rankly admits that the 
volume devoted to the revolutionary period was originally imagined as a 
long chapter in the book which uJ.timately appeared as Volume Two. 
Since he is not a Marxist and does not have a Russian backgroundt he 
appears a bit hesitant about offering a book dealing in other than institu-
tions and policies. Pipes is sympathetic, and a.grees with Mr. Carr that 
he is at his best when dealing "with specific institutions or constitu ... 
tional problems, but considerably weaker when called upon to tell the 
story of histo:rical eventso"B9 Deutscher, too, notes this side of Mr. 
88 · 
Carr. ! History .2! Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. v. 
89Pipes, p. 226. 
Carr and writes that Mro Carr 6s desire for a return to normalcy allows 
him to compromise with revolutionary ethics.90 
The most apparent example of Mr. Carr's regard for this return to 
normalcy is not found in the first volume, but in the fourth. In the 
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first volume, the reader is exposed to his attitude on this matter only 
by inference, but in the fourth volume, Socialism ~ ~ Country, Volume 
I, his satisfaction with the re-establishment of the Russian foreign 
ministry and his treatment of it as a symbol of the gradual re-emergence 
of the ap:paratus of traditional statism is almost flagranto He is happy 
when the Bolsheviks give up their Utopian ideas of an international 
collectiveness in foreign affairs and lose their haughty contempt fol" the 
ordinary conceptions and procedures of foreign policy. Here, then, we 
return anew to this idea that Mr. Ca:rr is not overly concerned with 
:revolutionary ideas, but with the facts of the revolution insofar as they 
contribute to the building of order out of chaos. 
At the height of the chaos, Mr. Carr was serving in Paris as a member 
of the British delegation to the Peace Conference. On August 18, 1919, he 
sent a letter to a f:rdend, a Mro Geogory in London, which included an ex-
tract from the rep~rt of a military man who attempted to determine to what 
extent real Bolshevism was disappearing and being replaced by socialism. 
According to the obser-ve:r, a Gener.al Malcolm of the Berlin section, Lenin 
was a comparative moderate who was gaining in authority, with the result 
that anarchy and terr-lorism were disappearingo Mr. Carr called this "the 
clearest and soundest thing" he had seen lately on the Russian situation."9l 
90neutsqher, p. 212. 
91Documents .2£ British Forei,&1, Policz, 1919 ... 1222., First Series, 
Vol. III, p. 510. 
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Lenin, to Mr. Carr, represented order and stability. 
For the sake of this order and stability, Mr. Carr constructs a ladder 
of events in this first volume of the history series which leads to the 
final triumph of Bolshevik power. The revolution of October was prole-
ta.rd.an, he writes, and the Bolsheviks were the spokesmen for the social 
forces which carried them into power~ But we have seen that the revo-
lution represented not proletariangsocialism, but, instead, the failure 
of the democratic fol:'Ces to congeal their efforts and present a united 
.front to the Bolshevikso In spite of evidence to the contrary, Mr. Carr 
holds to his assumption because to do otherwise would force him to re-
analyze bis approach to and treatment of the dissolution of the Con~ 
stituent Assemblyo 
Mr. Carr feels that if the Constituent Assembly did eventually as-
sume power, it would do so as a characteristic organ of bourgeois demo ... 
cracyo If, as he says, the revolution, by overthrowing the Provisional 
Government, had left the Soviets the "supreme repositories of revolution-
ary power,lf and, if the Council of Peopleis Commissars really did represent 
"a provisional workersu and pea.santsg government," then the proletarian 
t•evolution had occurred and the Constituent Assembly, as "a eharacteristio 
organ of the bourge,ois dem.ocra.cy11 stood outside the revolution and could 
not become a part of the proletarian rule.92 This argument is reeog. 
nizable as Lenin°s, and Mro Carr has been accused of making Lenin's pre-
mises his own without subjecting them to a critical e:x:amina.tiono93 But 
Mr. Carr is not nearly as dogmatic as Lenin was to become, for Mro Carr 
92carr, fl Histo;;:y 2! Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 105. 
93Micha.el Karpovich, Review of! Histocy .2£ Soviet Russia, Volume I, 
The Bolshevik Revolution, J,.917 .... rn, by E.H. Carr, The~~ Herald 
Tribune, Book Review Section, February 4, 1951, p. b. 
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thinks that Soviet power did not imply rejection of "the ultimate authori-
ty of the Constituent Assembly. ,.94 
Because he believes tl;le proletarian revolution had, oeeu.rred, Mr. 
Carr writes that the "fate of the Constituent Assembly ••• was sealed," 
and,that the assembly was "an anachronism onee the stage had peen super-
oeded by the proletarian-socialist revolution."95 .The proletarian revo~ 
lution had also solved the du.al power issue and the only choice .. left the 
Constituent Assembly was to "surrender or be wiped out. 1196 The prole-
tarian revolution of Mr. Carr's was not merely an. extension of the March 
revoluti~n (an argument he notes but dismisses by upholding the counter-
argument that the Bolshevik dissolution of the assembly was not something 
spontaneous) but was the "r.esul t of a considered . policy and a olear-,m 
!!!!! .!! ~ ;ero~ressi ve development .2£. the revolution !£2!!! !'!:! bourgeois 
democratic 12 !'!:! proletarian soctalist ph,ase. n97 
In view of the real nature of the revolution the elections to the 
Constituent ~ssembly, which awarded a minority position to the Bolsheviks, 
can be considered to accurately reflect the will of the people. Although 
the Bolsheviks did secure 9,800,000 votes, .the SRs garnered. 15,800,000, 
giving them a decisive viotory. 98 Even so, Mr. Carr feels this pointed 
' the way to a Bolshevik victory for those who had eyes to see. The future, 
may have seemed secure to Mr. Carr, but there was less certainty about 
94carr, f::. Riston; ,!! Soviet Russia, Volume I,, p. 105. 
95Ibid. , p. ll5. 
96:J;bid. 
97Ibid., Italics mine. 
98 
Oliver Radkey, ~ Elections 1g, the Constituent Assembly, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), P• 80. 
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the present. Prof~ssor Carr foresees that the Constituent Assembly would 
serve as a rallying point for opposition to the Soviet regime, even though 
the results of the vote did not preclude some kind of coalition in which 
the ~lsheviks might have enjoyed a strong position. But to attempt an 
hone~t working coalition was, as we have seen, _not.a par~ of Lenin's 
tactics. Mr. Carr excuses this attitude on the grounds the.Bolsheviks 
were So well-versed in revolutionary history they 001,11d see a parallel 
between the Frenoh Constituent Assembly of May, 1848, and the one which 
. i . 
commanded their immediate attention. In order to preserve the revolution 
and not have "it cut down to bourgeois standards," Mr. Carr feels the 
.Bolsheviks were justified, in view of his interpretation of the nature of 
the revolution, to exploit the assembly for their own ends: domination by 
the S-qyiets, primarily by the leadership of the two most influential 
. Soviets, the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets ~99 
In making this assumption that the revolution would be out to bour-
geois standards, an assumption he apparently bases upon his comparison 
between the French and Russian Constituent Assemblies, Mr. Carr has fallen 
victim to a practice of Lenin's: labelling. He regards the Constituent 
Assembly as "bourgeois" without properly explaining why. The assembly 
was not bourgeois in the sense of property interests. Most 1of the dele-
gates were professional men; lawyers, dootors, newspaper people, intel-
J.:eotuals. They belonged to the most unique class of Russians: the 
' ~ntelligentsia. The Russians have a word which more accurately describes 
the type of men which found themselves attempting to shape the destiny of 
a nation on that cold January day in 1918. That word is raznochintsi 
99carr, A History of Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 112. 
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and, while it has no literal translation in English, it means roughly 
"people of no class." Actually the word has connotations which are not 
strictly applicable to the men who composed the assembly, but it is 
certainly a more adequate description than ''bourgeois." Conversely, it 
is not entirely accurate to describe the Soviets as "proletarian." Or, 
at least, it is not accurate to describe the leadership as such. There 
was present there, as well as in the assembly, persons cut from the same 
bolt of cloth. But the Soviets represented to Lenin the most direct 
route to power. They were a cohesive body easily available' and, i.f not 
always dominated by the Bolsheviks, at least the Bolsheviks were general-
ly represented by an adequate and militant force. 
When Lenin raised the banner of' 11 All Power to the Soviets, 11 he did 
so because it was the most astute strategy he could have used.100 This 
is true regardless of' whether there is a~y truth in Mr. Carr's contention 
that the Soviets were "the natural, if self-appointed, heirs to the Con-
stituent Assembly."101 Mr. Carr writes that Lenin's ttsomewhat lukewarm 
attitude towards the Soviets in 1905 had been modified by their vigor and 
success in mobilizing popular support, and by the prestige which attached 
to them even after theil" downf'allo"l02 But he does not elabol"ate on the 
principal reason that caused Lenin to attach new importance to the Soviets. 
Lenin turned toward the Soviets because he found in them the power he 
needed to gain his ends. The power resting in the Constituent .Assembly 
was too representative, too accurate an indication of majority will, to 
encourage hope in Lenin that he could ever control it through legitimate 
· . lOOHugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin~ Ma.lenkov, (New York: Praeger, 
19.53), pp. 28-29. , 
101carr, A History~ Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 121. 
102 Ibid., p. 84. 
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means. The vote·shows this, and even Mr. Carr suspects the election was 
a "crushing vote of non-confidence.nl03 He qualifies this judgment be-
cause he finds in the out-of-date party lists a reason to suspect the 
vote was not indicative of majority will. 
Lenin could not claim the power which, because of the outcome of the 
election rightfully belonged to the Constituent Assembly. It is true that 
the liberal-democratic revolution had defaulted, and the election sub• 
stantiates this view since only two million votes were returned for the 
Kadet party.104 But this alone did not give the Bolsheviks the mandate 
'they felt was needed to assume power. So they cloaked their seizure of 
power in a shadowy claim that the bourgeois revolution had come and gone 
and with it the necessity for the Qonstituent Assembly. 
Radk~y assures us the elections to the assembly epitomized the revo-
lutionary mind of the greatest part of Russia when they were held.1o5 
Sukhanov passionately claims that Lenin's support of the Constituent As-
sembly as a means of exploiting it for the.preservation and ultimate 
domination of the Soviets wafi ltdeception on a national scale. 11106 And 
Berdyaev says the Bolshevi~s were acting more like the Tsarist police 
than a responsible element of the revolution when they were successful in 
their attempt to destroy the Constituent Assembly. Nor can we fail to 
mention those Populists· and those of the Marxist liberal tradition who as 
early as the 1870s were cautioning that the centralized power of a dicta-
torship would become reactionary.107 Shub writes, too:, that the Russian 
l03carr, Ii History !i. Soviet R\lssia, Vol"Wne I, p. 110. 
104Radkey, p. 80. 
10.5Ibid. 
106sukhanov, p. 551. 
107Franoo Venturi, Roots .2!:, Revolution, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1960), Chapter One. 
people, "in the freest eleotion in their history voted for moderate 
sooialism against Lenin and against the bourgeois. 11108 
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In an effort to explain away the results of the election, Mr. Carr 
distinguishes between the Right and Left SRs~ the latter having joined 
forces with the Bolsheviks at the "speoial" Peasants Congress in D~ 
oember. We have seen that Mr. Carr believes Lenin's argument that be-
oause of the oaalition the Bolsheviks represented the majority of.the 
peasants as well as the working classes. But we have also seen how the 
Second Congress of Soviets of Peasants' Deputies rebuked this argument •. 
It is true that the two wings of the party represented two different 
viewpoints. But it is less certain that these viewpoints were clear to 
the peasantry. It is also true that-when the Left SRs aligned themselves 
~ith the Bolsheviks it oast a different light on the physical makeup of 
~he Constituent Assembly, But, insofar as this was understood among the 
.. peasantry and would have affected the vote, it is unlikely suoh interparty 
' -
n:i.anipulations could have influenced many voters. The trend of voting in 
communities which were not subjected to pr~ssures from either the SRs or 
~he Bolsheviks forcibly demonstrates that the vote was not a matter of 
qhoice between Left and Right SRs or the Bolsheviks, since the peasants 
hardly understood the concept of nationalization, but simply a matter of 
the tend.ency of the peasants to follow those who had, in the past, been 
in the forefront enlisting support for the peasants' land demands. This 
lack of understanding of the issues is also illustrated by the fact that 
' . 
~n those communities which hosted SR or Bolshevik agitators the peasant 
generally voted for those who reached him with their message last.109 
108navid Shub, l;,~,: (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1948), p. 146. 
109Radkey, p. ;6. 
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The peasants near the front, from whence crune Bolshevik agitators, voted 
Bolshevik. Similar voting patterns were revealed where the SRs had 
agitators. Instances where whole villages knew their own collective mind 
well enough to disregard agitators were rare. Because of the great dis-
tances involved and the brief amount of time alloted the agitators after 
the October revolution and before the elections to the Constituent As-
sembly, the number of peasants influenced by the presence or absence of 
either party was negligible and it can be safely assumed that the ma-
jority of peasants voted .for those they had long regarded as their 
champions. In so doing, they were reiterating their faith in the ability 
of their duly .elected representatives to carry out the dictates o.f the 
people o.f the soil. This is not to say that if the Bolsheviks and the 
SRs had had an equal opportunity to present their cases that there might 
not have been radical shift in the vote. But about the only thing the 
peasant understood was that some sort of land distribution was being 
promised by everyone who sought his support. The peasant could not tell 
the difference between the two parties because of the similarity of their 
land progrruns, and when the conclusion is drawnj as M.r, Carr does, that 
the vote should have represented the choice between Bolshevism and Right 
SRs, this is ascribing too much political maturity to the peasant.110 It 
is unlikely that either party represented the social forces predominant 
in Russia, since neither had any real roots in the peasantry and probably 
neither understood the motivations of the peasantry outside of some vague 
~otion that a land decree would be necessary. 
The malleability of the peasants, or their political immaturity, did 
not concern Lenin, except insofar as it .. S'erved his purposes. He ca.red 
110carr, A History of Russia, Volume I, p. 111. 
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little whether the issues were understood. It better suited him if they 
were not 9 because he would not have been able to collectivize the farms 
and install a proletarian dictatorship over agriculture without meeting 
headon opposition from the SRs. ill that interested Lenin was mobilizing 
support for his program by holding out bait, in the form of land, to the 
peasants. ''We will win the peasants' trust with a single decree which 
will annihilate landed property; 11 Lenin told the Petersburg Soviet on 
0 t b 25 1..h d f t" B 1· h 'k 1 t' lll ·c o er - .· , \, · e · ay o · he o s evi revo u ion. 
But to Mr. Carr, the elections to the Constituent Assembly were in-
valid because the electors did not have an opportunity to vote on their 
prefex•ences between Left and Right SRs. This argument, known as the out-
dated-party-lists-argument, is considered even more cogent by Mr. Carr 
because 11in the large industrial cities the Bolsheviks had almost every-
where been ahead of the other pa:rties."112 But Radkey's figures tell a 
different story: the Bolsheviks were not as strong as they expected to be 
in the heavily industrialized regions outside Moscow and Petersburg.113 
It is well to note that the Bolsheviks secured an absolute majority in 
the two capitals, but it is equally well to r•emember Sukhanov' s admonition 
that the proletariat of those o:l.ties are as different from the ma,jority 
of workers as day and night 0 114 
Mr. Carr devotes a good deal of space to Lenin's careful development 
of the image of the Constituent Assembly as an agent which would be used 
against the people. This elaborate defense against any pre-eminence of 
111 Sukhanov, p. 629. 
112carr, A History of Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 112. 
113Radkey, pp. 38-39. 
114Ibid. 
.53 
the "bourgeoisie'' seems a bit overdone on Mr. Carr's pa.rt in light of 
what Ra.dkey tells us of the lack of support for the conservative 
element.11.5 The Constituent Assembly, in rea.lityt represented as strong 
a revolutionary f'orce as the Bolsheviks, if not stronger. 
As Lenin hounded the Constituent Assembly to death, he was merely 
climaxing a series of personal and individual acts designed to rout the 
assembly. Certain factors facilitated his success, but, all in all, 
Lenin must accept the responsibility for the failure of the assembly. 
Mr. Carr omits from his description of the Constituent Assembly many of 
the outright illegal acts which sounded the death-knell for the,_ assembly. 
He failed, for instance, to mention that two Kadet delegates· to the as-
semblywere murdered in their hospital beds because they would not join 
' 1 
forces with Lenin. Lenin may not have ordered or wished this, but the 
moral guilt is his because he encouraged extremism by his methods and his 
unbending opposition to compromise with anyone who would thereafter have 
to be treated as equals. Mr. Carr also fails to give the authority for 
outlawing the Kadets and the arrest of several leading Right SRs. Heim-
plies Lenin was able to employ these tactics because the Constituent As-
sembly did not enjoy the prestige in the public mind that some had as-
eribed to it. Mr. Carr neglects to mention a possible explanation for 
the lack of protest at the dissolution of the assembly might be because 
a substantial number of a:rmed men stood ready to disperse demonstrations 
with gunfire. It should be pointed out that the normally dependable 
Semenovsky and Pavlovsky regiments in Pet,ersburg were replaced by Letts, 
who were considered more likely to back up Bolshevik actions against the 
Constituent Assembly. Lenin organized the Cheka, established the right 
115 Radkey, p. 71. 
to call for re-elections, and locked up the electoral commission of the 
Provision~l Government whose duties were to look after the legality of 
the elections. Perhaps most significant was the fact that pre-assembly 
meetings of parties were forbidden by the Bolsheviks. 
The day the assembly convened, one demonstration took place in spite 
of the danger represented by the Letts. It was put down and several 
demonstrators were killed. Mr. Carr mentions this demonstration, but 
says "the act of dissolution passed almost without protest. 11116 The 
actual end to the assembly came when a sa:i.lo:i:• put out the lights "because 
the guard [(;aJ tired. 11 This Mr. Carr calls a "dramatic symbol," and he 
says every period of history has its own.117 He seems to feel that all 
the contempt for the assembly was summed up in this one gesture. Lastly, 
:Mr. Carr does not tell us of the actions Lenin himself took to disrupt the 
proceedings? such as feigning sleep on the benches and pretending to be 
snoring. 
Perhaps Mr. Carr could excuse these omissions on the grounds that it 
matters little now what tactics were used to dissolve the assembly. It 
was dissolved and that was thato But it does matter when it is assumed 
that because the assembly failed there is no reason to think democracy 
could work in Ra.ssia. Mr. Carr calls the assembly "bankrupt" and further 
states that its dissolution and subsequent events "demonstrated the lack 
of any solid basis, or any broad popular support in Russia for the institu-
tions and principles c,f bourgeois demoeracy. 11118 Because of this non-
support for democratic forms of government, Mr. Carr assumes "no alternative 
116carr, A History of Soviet Russia, Volume I, p. 120. 
ll?Ibidot P• 119. 
118Ibid., p. 121. 
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government ~o the Bolshevik.la?'capable of wielding power was suggested or 
could have been suggested. 11119 
Perhaps the assembly had a great deal to overcome before it could 
have wielded power • .And perhaps its eventual downfall oould have been 
forecast on the basis that it was the first time an attempt had been.made 
to run the nation on a strictly parliamentary - a democratic - basis 
without responsibility to or interfer·enoe from higher controls. Bo.t the 
Constituent Ass_embly was not altogether bankrupt from the standpoint of 
heritage • .An interest had been shown in the parliamentary form of govern-
ment throughout the period from Alexander I's reign right down to 1917. 
Russia also had its early modern Estates General. Throughout Russian 
history there has been evidence of a crude kind o:f demooraoywhioh has 
qeen aooeptable to the mainstream of the Russian population. The Zemstvos 
were locally administered, and even the Mir it,self was not totally devoid 
of the democratic spirit and praotioe. To be sure, Mr. Carr qualifies 
his statement, saying there is no support for bourgeois demooraoy. But 
the Constituent Assembly was not bourgeois in the sense it had property 
interests. It oame oloser to being r..,1&.,noohinets than bourgeois. So his 
qualification is mea.ningless, or at best, Leninist. 
Confronted with this evidenoe of support for demoeracy in Russia, 
Mr. Carr still argues that the disselution of the assembly ooourred partly 
because it was n0n~indigen0us to Russia. Bll.t the representative principle 
had a str,ong appeal in Russia. Certainly the vote to eleot delegates to 
the Constituent Assembly demonstrated an interest in the parliamentary 
system. If there was no broad support for democratic institutions or 
praotiees why did the Bolsheviks feel it necessary to put up a faoade with 
ll9Ib'd 119· . ·1' ., p. • 
all-the complex electoral machinery? .And why the present concern with 
democratic labels in what is essentially a totalitarian state? 
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We have reached the top of our Jacob's ladder. The determinism of 
which Mr. Carr has been accused and the inevitability which is a corol-
lary of this determinism can be sensed in a variety of ways in Mr. Carr's 
treatment 0£ the revolution and the dissolution of the Constituent As-
sembly. It is sensed in his philosophy of histo:ry, which regards cau-
sation as dictating the forms for the future, in his feeling that Lenin, 
because he was successfulj did represent the social will, and, conversely, 
that the Constituent Assembly, because it failed, was at odds with the 
October revolutionj in his regard for Lenin the state-builder rather than 
the state-destroyer, and, finally, in his personal desire for a 11return 
to normalcy" within the Russian state. 
Equally important toward leaving the reader with a sense of un-
warranted inevitability are Mr. Carr's omissions. He neglects Lenin's 
personal role in destroying the assembly, primarily because of his :re-
fusal to accept Lenin as a consciously motivated individual. He fails to 
mention the illegal acts perpetrated by the Bolsheviks, and he treats very 
lightly the damage the dissolut::l.on of the Constituent Assembly did to 
Marxian precepts of the evolution of soeialism • .And, lastly and most im-
portantly, he neither presents to the reader no:r counters the argument 




What Mr. Carr has failed to understand is the type of revolution_ 
which occurred in October. He makes this mistake not because he was un-
aware of all the facts, but because the successful culmination of the 
proletarian revolution was essential to his interpretation of the meaning 
b_ehind the· dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. Because he is a de-
terminist, he felt it necessary to see in the dissolution of the assembly 
another step in the consolidation of Bolshevik - proletarian - rule. Mr. 
Carr could not, in fairness to his philosophy of history, recognize the 
necessity for the completely autonomous nature of the Constituent As-
sembly unless it was to supersede the Bolshevik rule. Under Mr. Carr's 
philosophy of history, there were only two routes history could have 
taken at this junction in the road. Either the Constituent Assembly must 
prevail, making the Bolshevik seizure of power merely a.nocturnal ad-
venture, or the Bolsheviks must prevail, making the assembly an "anachro-
nism" which existed and could be disposed of at the pleasure of the Bolshe-
viks. Had the Constituent Assembly prevailed, Mr. Carr would say the 
antecedent causes leading to its success would have had to be different 
from what actually happened. As it was, the antecedent causes pointed to 
the unavoidable oonolusion that the assembly was "bankrupt." 
But the antecedent causes pointed to no such conclusion. Mr. Carr 
has misinterpreted the nature of these causes. The Q.otober revolution 
was nothing more than a skillfully planned adventure which paid off be-
cause of the personalities behind it. The Constituent Assembly was not 
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bankrupt, and we have Radkey's opinion, an opinion based on the most 
comprehensive analysis of the elections to the assembly, to substantiate 
this claim. He writes that the vote was a true reflection of the feeling 
in Russia. Any assembly held to ascertain the collective thought of a 
nation cannot be bankrupt unless the elections to that assembly failed 
to reflect a true sampling. There is every indication that the sample 
was a true onej not only because of the manner in which the elections 
were conducted, but also because the articulate voices of Russia, as ex-
pressed in the newspapers and periodicals, favored some kind of parlia-
mentary type of government. The Kadets considered it ''the only true lord 
of Russia," when they spoke of the Constituent Assembly, but their in-
ability to act had cost them the confidence of the people.1 The Petro-
grad Union to Defend the Constituent Assembly attempted to rally support 
for the assembly by claiming the "last hope of the Russia revolution 
Eiai/ dead11 when the assembly was dissolved.2 The Inter-Ward Conference 
and the Central Municipal Duma, meeting without a quorum because it had 
been since the October revolution, composed of a majority of Bolsheviks 
who had earlier in the month walked out, called for defense of the as-
sembly and held meetings to see what could be doneo 
There is more which shows the Constituent Assembly was not without 
prestige, despite M:r. Carr's claims to the contrary. The Red Cross de-
clared the day the assembly met a national holiday, and at a huge meeting 
in the Chinizelli Circus, I. G. Tsereteli gave an address calling for 
"All Power to the Constituent Assembly," obviously a counter to the 
1This is cited from a leaflet distributed to the people of Petrograd 
by the Kadets on January 19, 1918. The leaflet is now in the Hoover War 
Library. It is cited in Bunyan and Fisher, p. 209. 
2Delo Naroda, Noo 219, December 9, 1917, p. 4. Cited in Bunyan and 
Fisher, p. 351.. 
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Bolshevik slogan.3 And in the meeting of the Central Executive Committee 
on January 19., 1918, where it was decided to dissolve the assembly, Stroev, 
a representative of the United Internati~nalists, said the Left SRs who 
had linked arms with the Bolsheviks were "clever fellows who had managed 
to lose their faith in the Constituent Assembly in about an hour and a 
half. 114 The Bolshevik Rizzanev said the assembly should be given a 
chance to show what it could do 9 and that the people had not formed "an 
idea of its possibilities in one day. 11 5 Rizzanev's comments are parti-
cularly interesting inasmuch as Mro Carr regards the Constituent Assembly 
as unable to compromise on fundamental differences of doctrine.6 This 
lent a certain atmosphere of unreality to the proceedings, he claims. 
Yet on the next page, Mr. Carr concludes the assembly was·· bankrupt be-
cause "it could do nothing more than repeat in substance what the Second 
All ... Russian Congress of Soviets of Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies had 
done ••• ten weeks earlier. 117 This seems somewhat contradictory, since in 
order for the Constituent Assembly to reach agreements similar to those 
of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets, it would have been neces-
sary to compromise to some extent. And Mr. Carr does not identify the 
congress of whioh he speaks. Was :it the "special" Second JUl ... Russian 
Congress of Soviets, held in late November, or the Second All-Russian 
Congress of Soviets held in early December? From his description of the 
assembly of Soviets as being "ten weeks earlier'," it appears he speaks 
3Bunyan and Fisher, p. J45. 
4Noviia Zhizn,, No. 6, January 22, 1918, p. 3, cited in Bunyan and 
Fisher, p. 383. 
5Pravda, No.?, January 24, 1918, p. 2, cited in Bunyan and Fisher, 
p. 384. 
6carr, A ~tory of Soviet Russia 9 Volume I, p. 118. 
?Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
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of the "special" conference.8 If' that is the case, then there would have 
been a wider difference between it and the Constituent Assembly than be-
tween the December Congress of Soviets and the assembly, and, thusly, 
more of a compromise involved. 
Sukhanov claimed the people had not lost faith in the Constituent 
Assembly, and Avilov, a United Internationalist, claimed Lenin had not 
pointed out satisfaotorilywhy the Constituent Assembly did not reflect 
the will of the people.9 Even more incriminating is Sukhanov•s contention 
that the assembly had not refused to transfer power to the Soviets simply 
because the question had not even arisen. Of all this, Mr.·Carr has 
nothing to say. 
Philosophically, the Constituent Assembly was based on the strongest 
claims of representation. It was challenged by Lenin on philosophical 
grounds: i.e., that the October revolution was the proletarian revolution 
and the assembly was a holdover from the bourgeoisie revolution of March 
and had no plaoe in the new society. But Lenin knew the philosophical 
argument would not impress the delegates to the assembly, who wer.e secure 
in the knowledge they represented the social forces. He was forced to -
extra-legal methods to dissolve the assembly. 
Since Lenin's ideological arguments do not necessarily prove the 
Constituent Assembly was bankrupt, the praotioal measures he took to dis-
solve it indicates quite the contrary. Bu.t Mr. Carr cites only the 
ideological argument and does not tell us of the real challenge to Lenin 
that the assembly represented. If the assembly had been allowed to 
8Ibid. 
9Novaia Zhizn, No. 6, January 22, 1918, p. 4, oited in Bunyan and 
Fisher, p. 3ei. 
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fulfill its obligations to the voters, the Bolshevik grip on the nation 
would be lost. But a naked show of force, as ultimately happened, must 
be tempered with ideological considerations. So while the Bolsheviks 
were making preparations for the dissolution of the assembly - a disso-
lution made possible 9 Mr. Carr says, by the "clear-cut ••• progressive 
development of the revolution from its bourgeois democratic to its 
/ 
proletarian socialist phase," the Bolsheviks kept reassuring the dele-
gates to the assembly that the seizure of the government did not mean the 
breakup of the Constituent Assembly.lo Lenin had said the legality of 
the elections could be guaranteed only by a democratic government and 
not one made up of Kadets, Kornilovists and compromisers. Since the 
government consisted of only four Kadets and ten socialists on the date 
of the October revolution, and since the elections failed to vindicate 
the Kadets, the Constituent Assembly, according to the Bolsheviks' own 
definition1 was a legally constituted assembly. Couple this with the 
fact that the Bolsheviks actually conducted the elections and the case 
for the assembly appears even stronger. 
The trouble with Mr. Carr's interpretation is that it reverses the 
importance of the ideological. and practical considerations for dis-
solving the Constituent Assembly. This can be linked with his determin-
istic approach to writing historye For Mr. Carr it is necessary that the 
October revolution be a prelude to the dissolution of the assembly. And 
for the dissolution of the assembly to fit into the pattern of causation 
Mr. Carr has drawn, the October revolution must have rendered it un-
necessary to convene the Constituent Assembly. While Mr. Carr agrees 
10rzvestii, No. 209, November 10, 1917, cited in Bunyan and Fisher, 
p. 341. 
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with Lenin that under no circumstances could the revolution of October 
be made to fit into the bourgeois mould of the March revolution, an in-
valid statement since neither revolution was "bourgeois," he overlooks 
the fact that that is exactly what happened. The October revolution 
came to a close when the voters cast their ballots for those who rose to 
power on the strength of the March revolution and had retained the confi-
dence of the people. To those-voters, the Constituent Assembly_was the 
only authoritative expression of the national will. But to the Bolshe-
viks it was something quite different, for they were looking beyond the 
democracy to the proletarian dictatorship. There was little choice left 
the Bolsheviks: dissolve the assembly in spite of the national will and 
consolidate their position in any way they could, or join the assembly 
and take a role, a secondary role, in the formulation of a new state. 
There is yet another point Mr. Carr has missed in assuming the 
October revolution represented the nia,jority will of the populace. The 
October revolution was in the traditional Russian manner of change: from 
the top down, not from the bottom up, and, in failing to see this, Mr. 
Carr has missed the point of the revolution. Mr. Carr's regard for 
normalcy has forced him to consider the Constituent Assembly as a de-
parture from ordinary, "normal" practices in Russia. It was surely that. 
The Constituent Assembly was formulated from the bottom up, or at least 
from ~he middle up, an extremely unusual factor in the traditional Russian 
political pattern. The assembly was largely liberal in outlook, but even 
so, it was in a sense more revolution~ry than the handfuls of radicals 
who led the October revolution. The radicals have always been with Russia. 
This liberal makeup of the assembly was its strength, not its weakness and 
it cannot be maintained, as does Mro Carr, that merely because it stood 
in the way of Bolshevik power that it was bankrupt. Mr. Carr fails to see 
that by the act of dissolution, and in the Bolshevik consolidation of 
rule, there was something counter-revolutionary. The return to the tra-
ditional pattern of government is welcomed by Mr. Carr, not because he 
knows this is a social force which will facilitate the Bolshevik Consoli-
dation of rule, but because in Russ,ian political life!I at its most 
liberal, the government exists iQ.r. the people, but not of or by the 
people. Wolfe so deplores this oversight that he claims Mr. Carr ignores 
11 the revolutione 
Mr. Carr may be right when he hints that the Constituent Assembly 
was doomed before it convened, but he may be right for the wrong reasons. 
The Constituent Assembly failed because there was a concentrated effort 
to make it fail. It did not fail because of an inherent difference with 
the traditions of Russia, as Mr. Carr indicates, although it is true the 
assembly might eventually have run afoul of these traditions. If there 
was any bankruptcy ab.out the assembly, it stemmed not from its purpose 
or role in the revolution, but from the men who sat in it. The men met 
fully expecting to be harassed by the Bolsheviks, but they armed them-
selves only with candles, in case the lights were extinguished, and 
sandwiches, in the event they were not allowed to leave the building. 
These were poor weapons for saving the democracy. 
The elections to the Constituent Assembly did not, then, point the 
way to the. Bolshevik victory o The electicfos registered nothing except 
the fact that the peasantry had little understanding of the political 
issues, that they voted for familiar faces except when convinced other-
wise, and that the Bolsheviks had little power outside of Petrograd and 
Moscow. Mr. Carr is consistent with his philosophy of history when he 
11wolfe, p. 284. 
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relegates the assembly to an insignificant role in the revolution, but 
his philosophy has betrayed him into thinking that the b'l\lk of the Russian 
people were ready for a proletarian revolution. It is a fact that articu-
late voices of Russia were not thinking of a Bolshevik form of·government, 
but of a more legally constituted form such as the type they had been 
working toward since 1905. A basis for democracy might not have existed 
in Russia~ but :i.t is also a f'act that the interest and the determination 
to try a parliamentary form of government was high. The Bolsheviks had 
the strength to overcome this determination not by convincing the nation 
their way was the only way, but because they had so successfully identi-
fied themselves with every cause that the lines between traditional 
parties had become blurred. The Bolsheviks rode to power on the most 
tried and true revolutionary tactic: divide and conquer. 
Mr. Carr tacitly approves of the dissolution of the Constituent As-
sembly because it fits in nicely with the progress of the revolution. 
Once the assembly was removed, it became possible for the Soviets to 
move on into that sphere Mr. Carr is most concerned with: the drafting 
of policies and the establishment of institutions. He is much more at 
home there than he is in the revolution.· 
The question whether Mr. Carr regards the revolution and the Bolshe-
vik rule as legitimate can be answered in the affirmative. From the 
first days of the October revolu·tion to the dissolution of the Constitu-
ent Assembly, the attitude displayed by Mr. Carr toward the ultimate out-
come of things leaves little doubt that he regarded the Bolsheviks as the 
legitimate heirs to the Tsars. But one must be careful in assuming that 
legitimacy has anything to do with revolution. This author is inclined 
to think that legitimacy depends upon a multitude of circumstances and 
that judgment cannot be rendered except on the basis of human relations. 
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Where the error is made is in looking to history to prove the legality. 
This is the error Mr. Carr made. 
There is only one basis for.assuming that Lenin represented the 
social forces of the day and t~t is to. consider him as representative 
1J. 
of the same f'orces which kept the Tsars in power. But thilto ignore 
the March revolution, the disintegration of the army and the demand for 
change that was, if not sweeping the oc.m.ntry, at least creeping a.cross . . 
it. And since Mr. Carr seems insistent that the October revolution was 
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